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This Article analyzes the delicate balance of congressional 
and judicial authority granted by the Reconstruction 
Amendments. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments vest Congress with powers to enforce civil rights, 
equal treatment, and civic participation. Their reach extends 
significantly beyond the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ narrow 
construction of congressional authority. In recent years, the 
Court has struck down laws that helped secure voter rights, 
protect religious liberties, and punish age or disability 
discrimination. Those holdings encroach on the amendments’ 
allocated powers of enforcement. 
Textual, structural, historical, and normative analyses 
provide profound insights into the appropriate roles of the 
Supreme Court and Congress in achieving aspirations of the 
Second Founding. The framework that emerges requires the 
judiciary to defer to legitimate legislative functions in enforcing 
racial equality, dignitary justice, and access to the ballot box. 
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Congress’s discretion extends to safeguards for fundamental 
rights, civil liberties, and political representation. Rational basis 
review is appropriate when Congress advances autonomy, 
equality, and franchise. However, when courts safeguard equal 
enjoyment of fundamental rights against legislative 
encroachments, those three amendments require heightened 
judicial scrutiny of adverse state actions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Reconstruction Amendments realigned the balance of 
power between the judicial and legislative branches. The 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments empowered Congress 
to enforce national civil rights policies. They broke with the 
protections of slavery that had been built into the original 
Constitution,1 which the Supreme Court had upheld.2 The 
Fifteenth Amendment, in turn, advanced anti-racist civic 
participation. 
Despite the monumental alterations to the Constitution, 
less than a decade after their ratification, the Supreme Court 
began to chip away at legislative authority to enforce federal 
civil rights law.3 In recent cases, such as City of Boerne v. Flores4 
and Shelby County v. Holder,5 the Court continued to interfere 
with core structural features of constitutional reconstruction.6 
The Court has further prevented lawmakers from enforcing 
laws pertaining to civil remedies for the victims of sexual 
violence,7 age and handicap discrimination,8 minority voting 
 
 1. See Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & 
the Thirteenth Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 321 (2004) (discussing clauses 
of the Constitution that protected the institution of slavery). 
 2. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 625–26 (1842) 
(overturning Edward Prigg’s conviction under state law for kidnapping a Black 
mother and her children in order to return them to a Maryland owner). 
 3. See  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (holding 
unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875). 
 4. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 5. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 6. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (holding that the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 exceeded Congress’s power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it “contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain 
separation of powers and the federal balance”); Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557 
(holding that § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was unconstitutional). 
 7. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
 8. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001); 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 62 (2000). 
852 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849 (2021) 
 
preclearance,9 campaign financing,10 and matching campaign 
contributions.11 
The Reconstruction Amendments augmented legislative 
powers and were meant to check the judiciary from repeating 
the monumental injustice of Dred Scott v. Sandford.12 Contrary 
to their framing purposes, the Court has continued to erode the 
Reconstruction Amendments’ enforcement authority in cases 
like United States v. Cruikshank,13 the Civil Rights Cases,14 and 
Shelby County v. Holder.15 Alexander Hamilton long ago pointed 
out that the judiciary should exercise judgment but not impose 
its will on the people.16 The Court often acts without due 
constitutional restraints in matters where the Constitution 
appears to grant Congress the leading role in formulating 
policies.17 Justice Kagan commented on this phenomenon in a 
dissent, asserting that by reserving to itself exclusive 
 
 9. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557. 
 10. See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 
(2014). 
 11. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 
721, 728 (2011). 
 12. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 418–19 (1857) (holding that Blacks were not 
citizens of the United States). 
 13. 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1875) (holding unconstitutional a federal criminal 
statute that prevented Blacks from exercising their constitutional rights). 
 14. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (holding unconstitutional the desegregation 
provisions of Civil Rights Act of 1875). 
 15. 570 U.S. at 535 (striking the § 4(b) coverage formula of the Voting 
Rights Act because the law violated the “principle that all States enjoy equal 
sovereignty”). 
 16. Alexander Hamilton set out the theory of judicial review in Federalist 
78. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall, and the Politics of 
Constitutional Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1209–10 (2003) (contrasting 
Hamilton’s competence and Marshall’s institutional, textual defense of judicial 
review). 
 17. The doctrine of constitutional review requires courts to neither 
“‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of 
deciding it’” nor to “‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is 
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’” Wash. State Grange 
v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008) (quoting Ashwander 
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
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interpretive authority, the Supreme Court has turned the 
Justices into “black-robed rulers overriding citizens’ choices.”18 
As matters currently stand, the Supreme Court’s 
interpretive exclusivity of Reconstruction powers lacks 
meaningful checks against judicial supremacy.19 Instead, 
Congress should be able to define and follow through with policy 
priorities consistent with constitutional text, structure, history, 
and norms. The Court cannot act as the philosophical guardian 
of constitutional morality.20 It is, rather, a branch of government 
that requires checks and balances to limit its encroachment into 
legitimate lawmaking.21 The Reconstruction Amendments 
 
 18. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. 
Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. V. On the difficulty of amending the United States 
Constitution see Sanford Levinson, Still Complacent After All These Years: 
Some Rumination on the Continuing Need for a “New Political Science” (Not to 
Mention A New Way of Teaching Law Students About What Is Truly Most 
Important About the Constitution), 89 B.U. L. REV. 409, 422 (2009) (“Article V 
makes amendment extraordinarily difficult if not functionally impossible.”). 
 20. 1 PLATO, The Republic, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 503, 764 (B. 
Jowett trans., Random House 1937) (1892); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 242 
(1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution does not constitute us as 
‘Platonic Guardians’ nor does it vest in this Court the authority to strike down 
laws because they do not meet our standards of desirable social policy, 
‘wisdom,’ or ‘common sense.’”); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) 
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic 
Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly 
do not. If they were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living 
in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the 
direction of public affairs. 
The journalist Linda Greenhouse quotes Ruth Bader Ginsburg during her 
Senate confirmation hearings, “we must always remember that we live in a 
democracy that can be destroyed if judges take it upon themselves to rule as 
Platonic guardians.” Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Sense of 
Judicial Limits, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 1993), at A1. 
 21. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 
39–40 (2005) 
[T]he U.S. Supreme Court is well on its way to becoming a political 
court . . . . Constitutional cases in the open area are aptly regarded 
as “political” because the Constitution is about politics and because 
cases in the open area are not susceptible of confident evaluation 
on the basis of professional legal norms. They can be decided only 
on the basis of a political judgment, and a political judgment cannot 
be called right or wrong by reference to legal norms. 
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provide that the American people’s representatives in Congress 
take the lead in the advancement of life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of freedom. This Article has significant implications to federal 
civil rights and civil liberties laws affecting indigent, elderly, 
and handicapped litigants. 
Part I reviews leading methods of constitutional 
interpretation, beginning with the popular constitutionalism of 
Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron. Their arguments against 
judicial interpretive exclusivity are juxtaposed with David 
Strauss’s common law constitutionalism and Ronald Dworkin’s 
moral constitutionalism. After critiquing those approaches, the 
Article argues for a balanced interpretation of Reconstruction 
powers. 
Part II explains Reconstruction power in the context of 
heightened judicial scrutiny. It focuses on three areas of review 
related to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments. Predicates for heightened judicial review are 
modulated by the antecedents, principles, enumerations, and 
liberal equality norms consistent with the Reconstruction 
Amendments. 
Part III surveys Supreme Court rulings that undermine 
congressional enforcement of those three constitutional 
amendments. It discusses cases of judicial supremacy that 
prevent Congress from enacting robust civil rights and civil 
liberties laws. Part IV explores the limits of interpretive finality 
in those two areas. It describes when judicial deference must 
give way to congressional policies consistent with the structure, 
history, text, and norms of constitutional reconstruction. 
I.  WEAK OR STRONG JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The Supreme Court has been the final arbiter of 
constitutional interpretation since the Early Republic, but it 
only declared its interpretational supremacy during the Civil 
Rights Era. Marbury v. Madison22 set the basic structure of 
judicial review and articulated the seminal statement of 
constitutional interpretation.23 However, nowhere in Marbury 
 
 22. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 23. Id. at 177. 
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did Chief Justice Marshall assert that the Supreme Court is or 
should be the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution. In the 
alternative, each department of government may be said to have 
the institutional competence to make rational decisions toward 
legitimate ends. 
The Court took a definitive step toward exercising judicial 
supremacy in its 1958 Cooper v. Aaron24 decision, in a case that 
was essential for desegregation in Arkansas and throughout the 
South, declaring “the basic principle that the federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”25 
Thereafter, a muscular version of judicial review functioned as 
a two-edged sword that later decisions wielded to both advance 
and repel civil and political freedoms.26 This Part of the Article 
explains how the Court developed several doctrines consistent 
with the principles of political and civil Reconstruction. Part III 
then turns to cases where, to the contrary, the Justices pared 
down Congress’s efforts to safeguard autonomy, equality, and 
franchise. Part IV reconciles the polarities by offering a theory 
to balance structural, normative, textual, and historical features 
of constitutional reconstruction that best preserves judicial 
review without compromising legislative civil rights 
enforcement. Before turning to how the Court has expanded and 
contracted the aspirational enforcement of reconstruction 
 
 24. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 25. Id. at 18. Cooper relied on judicial supremacy to advance civil rights, 
requiring a public school to desegregate pursuant to the equal protection 
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Id. at 4. The 
Court followed up with a series of per curiam desegregation opinions that often 
cited Brown, but rarely provided any depth of analysis. See, e.g., Johnson v. 
Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 61–62 (1963) (per curiam) (relying on Brown to find that 
the segregation of public facilities, such as courtrooms, is constitutionally 
impermissible); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 351, 353 (1962) (per 
curiam) (holding that public segregation in airport dining facilities violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93, 94–95 (5th 
Cir. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (vacating a decision that 
had declared the segregation of public golf courses to be constitutional); 
Dawson v. Mayor of Balt., 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir. 1955), aff’d, 350 U.S. 
877 (1955) (per curiam) (finding that racial segregation of public beaches and 
bathhouses was not constitutionally permissible); Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. 
Supp. 204, 205-06 (E.D. La. 1963), aff’d, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam) 
(granting injunctive relief for the desegregation of a city auditorium). 
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
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norms, the Article addresses arguments made by the skeptics of 
strong judicial review27 and proponents of it.28 The truth lies 
somewhere in between, explicitly and implicitly in the altered 
structure of government created by the Reconstruction 
Amendments. The premise of this Article is that the virtual 
judicial veto that strict scrutiny review represents is valid when 
the Court protects civil rights but not when it strikes civil rights 
legislation. The first section of Part I begins by scrutinizing 
divergent schools of thought on judicial review. The second 
section then proposes an original approach grounded in 
Reconstruction principles of representative democracy. 
Deference, not judicial veto, is needed in cases reviewing 
representative governments’ efforts to address injustices or 
discriminations. 
A.  Popular Constitutionalism 
Mark Tushnet formulates a theory for “taking the 
Constitution away from the courts.”29 His book on the subject 
advocates to “reject the general theory of judicial supremacy.”30 
He suggests retaining legislative authority in constitutional 
enforcement but offers little explanation of what constitutional 
changes would need to be made. He does not, for example, point 
to specific portions of the Constitution that set limits on 
Congress. Nor does he explain how federalist considerations 
would play a role. It may be that amending the existing 
Constitution is the only option, but Article V creates significant 
barriers against passing and then ratifying any textual changes 
 
 27. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM 
THE COURTS (1999). For further study on popular constitutionalism see 
generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004);  Jeremy Waldron, The 
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) 
[hereinafter The Core of the Case]. 
 28. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); 
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION (1996). 
 29. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at i. 
 30. Id. at 13. 
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to the Constitution.31 Tushnet speculates only so far as to say 
“[p]erhaps defiance may be appropriate only when the 
Declaration [of Independence’s] human rights principles are at 
stake.”32 Tushnet further asserts that the principles of the 
Declaration remain foundational to constitutional structure 
that has the people conducting “thin Constitution’s meaning” 
through their representatives.33 Tushnet does not, however, 
provide details about how reconstructed judicial review would 
be constituted and operationalized.34 Nor does he explain to 
what extent stare decisis and doctrines generally would be 
honored in a system without judicial finality. 
An alternative criticism of judicial review is tendered by 
Jeremy Waldron. He begins with the premise that “quite apart 
from the outcomes it generates, judicial review is democratically 
illegitimate.”35 In his most expositive work on the matter, Law 
and Disagreement, Waldron writes that distrusting the people’s 
political will is inconsistent with “the idea of rights” that “is 
based on a view of the human individual as essentially a 
thinking agent.”36 Society’s decisionmaking must be built on 
“the imperative that one be treated as an equal . . . .”37 In a 
democracy, the people’s capacity “of evolving a shared and 
reliable sense of right and wrong, justice and injustice, in their 
conversations with one another” is inconsistent with 
 
 31. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing that a constitutional amendment 
requires two thirds of both houses of Congress to propose amendment and 
three fourths of the states to approve it); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitution 
Day Lecture: American Constitutionalism, Almost (but Not Quite) Version 2.0, 
65 ME. L. REV. 77, 92 (2012); Levinson, supra note 19, at 422 (“Article V makes 
amendment extraordinarily difficult if not functionally impossible . . . .”). 
 32. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 13. 
 33. Id. at 14, 51–53. See generally ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND 
EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE DECLARATION (2012). 
 34. Tushnet’s suggestion appears to be the unlikely solution of an 
“override” of judicial holdings by “two-thirds majority in both houses” of 
Congress. TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 175. 
 35. The Core of the Case, supra note 27, at 1346. 
 36. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 250 (1991) [hereinafter 
LAW AND DISAGREEMENT]. 
 37. The Core of the Case, supra note 27, at 1375. 
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“announc[ing] that the products of any deliberative process are 
to be mistrusted.”38 
Waldron’s criticism homes in on the disconnect between 
democratic institutions and judicial finality. The review of the 
judiciary might, to the contrary, be said to be democracy 
enforcing. Indeed, that is a critical point of John Hart Ely’s 
“representation-reinforcing mode” of interpretation.39 Waldron’s 
theory thus does not adequately address circumstances in which 
courts get right the representation-reinforcing facets of 
government for the people. Waldron recognizes that the 
legislative process may be “more complex and laborious” but is 
confident that the extra time needed to resolve constitutional 
matters “is not like the affront to democracy involved in 
removing issues from a vote altogether and assigning them to a 
separate non-representative forum like a court.”40 The Supreme 
Court can itself slow a rush to popular legislation harming the 
very matters Carolene Products41 recognized in the judicial 
province. Those being protection of discrete and insular 
minorities, fundamental rights, and democratic equality.42 
Balance should be drawn to reflect the nature and function 
of political institutes. In some cases Waldron is undoubtedly 
correct to say that the legislative process should be “a noisy 
scenario in which men and women of high spirit argue 
passionately and vociferously about what rights we have, what 
justice requires, and what the common good amounts to, 
motivated in their disagreement not by what’s in it for them but 
by a desire to get it right.”43 Here we may think of law struck 
down in United States v. Morrison44 or Shelby County v. 
Holder.45 Missing is recognition that the Supreme Court itself 
often advances civil rights against local prejudices and political 
intolerance. Into this second group must be grouped Brown v. 
 
 38. LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 222. 
 39. John Hart Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of 
Judicial Review, 37 MD. L. REV. 451, 474 (1978). 
 40. LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 305–06. 
 41. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 42. See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 43. LAW AND DISAGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 305. 
 44. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 45. 570 U.S. 529 (2013); see infra Part IV.C.1–2. 
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Board of Education,46 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,47 
Katzenbach v. McClung,48 and Obergefell v. Hodges.49 And 
Waldron’s and Tushnet’s theories leave courts too weak to check 
unbridled uses of state or federal powers.50 
B.  Muscular Judicial Interpretation 
While Tushnet and Waldron argue that constitutional 
democracy requires legislatures to be the final arbiters of 
constitutional meaning, there can be little doubt that any 
drastic change to the current system of judicial finality could 
lead to instability of social order.51 Among those arguing for the 
stability of retaining judicially driven constitutional meaning, 
Professor David Strauss stresses that the current system “works 
well enough, and it would be too costly and risky to reopen the 
question whether, abstractly considered, it is the best possible 
arrangement.”52 Far from needing to be rectified, he argues that 
a common law process for interpreting the Constitution best 
 
 46. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (stating that “such segregation is a denial of 
the equal protection of the laws”). 
 47. 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (enforcing application of the Civil Rights Act 
to a motel by denying their ability to discriminate based on race). 
 48. 379 U.S. 294, 305 (applying Heart of Atlanta Motel to a desegregation 
case involving a local restaurant). 
 49. 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (concluding that under the Equal Protection 
Clause “couples of the same-sex may not be deprived” of the right to marry). 
 50. But see The Core of the Case, supra note 27, at 1351 (“[A] core 
argument against judicial review that is independent of both its historical 
manifestations and questions about its particular effects . . . .”). 
 51. Tushnet admits as much, writing, “We really cannot know how 
Congress would perform if the courts exited . . . .” TUSHNET, supra note 27, at 
55. For other scholars, stability of stare decisis rationalizes its continued 
reliance on judicial review. Professor Richard Fallon, for example, argues that 
the dysfunctionality of the legislative process justifies judicial veto. See 
RICHARD FALLON JR., THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: THE INVENTION 
AND LOGIC OF STRICT JUDICIAL SCRUTINY 199 (2019) (arguing that “courts are 
likely to be more reliable in identifying relevant moral and legal rights”). 
Missing from Fallon’s account, however, is recognition that the court too can 
be dysfunctional. 
 52. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 877, 913–14 (1996). 
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sheds light on actual constitutional practice.53 He contends that 
the U.S. constitutional system “has become a common law 
system, one in which precedent and past practices are, in their 
own way, as important as the written U.S. Constitution itself.”54 
This is not only a call for continuing current judicial supremacy 
but for embracing it as indispensable to an evolving 
Constitution.55 
Strauss provides few details about the conditions 
appropriate for deviating from precedent. His formula relies on 
good faith in judges, removed from the partisanship of 
legislative policy making.56 Ultimately, he is ambiguous about 
how to apply and alter opinions that encroach on the power of 
other branches of government. Courts “should think twice 
about . . . judgments of right and wrong when they are 
inconsistent with what has gone before”; interpretive shifts are 
justified when, “on reflection, we are sufficiently confident that 
we are right, and . . . the stakes are high enough.”57 Left 
unexplained is how to determine that the stakes are high 
enough, how judges can eschew subjective judgments, to what 
extent popular values should play a role, the extent to which 
shifts in precedents should take place, how the public will accept 
the shifts, whether the shifts in judgments can be based on 
shifts of members on the court, and more. Strauss’s account 
leaves finality to judges, irrespective of whether they are 
expanding rights—as in Brown v. Board of Education58—or 
contracting them—as in Shelby County v. Holder.59 
 
 53. See id. at 887 (“[W]hen people interpret the Constitution, they rely 
not just on the text but also on the elaborate body of law that has 
developed . . . .”). 
 54. STRAUSS, supra note 28, at 3. 
 55. See id. at 35 (“Those precedents, traditions, and understandings form 
an indispensable part of . . . the [C]onstitution as it actually operates, in 
practice.”). 
 56. Strauss, supra note 52, at 898. 
 57. Id. at 896–97. 
 58. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (expanding the rights of Black students by 
finding segregated schools “inherently unequal”). 
 59. 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013) (contracting the protections provided 
under the Voting Rights Act). 
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Likewise, he leaves largely unelaborated the attitude and 
ideology judges should take in interpreting the Constitution 
with scant fleshing out of what Strauss calls the “attitudes of 
humility and cautious empiricism.”60 It leaves uncertainty in 
how to assess the Court’s work and how to rectify judicial 
overreaching. The judiciary engages in what Strauss 
characterizes as an evolutionary process that relies heavily on 
earlier precedents and demonstrates “unmistakable concern 
with matters of policy and political morality.”61 This statement 
relates to how judges go about creating constitutional common 
law in areas like free speech, but process, precedent, and 
political morality lack concreteness to render them immune 
from legislative correction. In his common law constitutional 
order, the people have little role in the unfolding of 
constitutional change; indeed, judicial finality disempowers 
them from effectively relying on representative politics. 
Judges must rely on reason in matters of constitutional 
interpretation. “We are not final because we are infallible, but 
we are infallible only because we are final,” as Justice Jackson 
jocundly put it.”62 And we know that reason is fallible. With no 
meaningful inter-branch oversight, the Justices make final 
pronouncements on matters as consequential as process, equal 
protection, and voting.63 Appellate review can correct judicial 
error, but the Supreme Court remains atop a hierarchy of 
interpretation. The legislature plays no significant role in 
constitutional development in Strauss’s scheme.64 This runs 
counter to the Reconstruction Amendments’ grants of necessary 
and proper authority in § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and § 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.65 The judiciary is left to rely on reason alone to 
 
 60. STRAUSS, supra note 28, at 40. 
 61. Id. at 62. 
 62. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 63. See, e.g., Holder, 570 U.S. at 553 (stating that the protections of the 
Voting Rights Act are no longer justified). 
 64. See STRAUSS, supra note 28, at 62–76 (emphasizing the role of the 
Court in First Amendment application and describing the current standard as 
a “product of common law evolution”). 
 65. See supra notes 3–11 and accompanying text. 
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determine what is “fair or is better policy,”66 with no 
congressional ability to right judicial overreaching. 
Constitutional common law leaves uncertainty about the 
meaning of the nation’s fundamental documents. Supporters of 
judicial finality notoriously arrive at divergent conclusions 
about cases that often reflect prior political choices.67 Ronald 
Dworkin, another prominent advocate of strong judicial finality, 
argues that judges should identify the theory that, among 
conflicting alternatives, “is morally the strongest.”68 He writes 
that courts are designed to function as “forums of principle.”69 
Drawing from the Fourteenth Amendment, Dworkin argues 
that the central political ideal embodied in the Constitution is 
justice in a “society of citizens both equal and free,”70 where 
judges must be constrained by the principle of “equal concern 
and respect.”71 Where there is social disagreement about the 
principled outcome of cases, he argues that “courts should take 
final authority to interpret the Constitution.”72 
Dworkin’s approach fails in an important respect to justify 
a Supreme Court’s veto. On why the judiciary should have the 
last say in constitutional interpretation, his argument is 
circular and unconvincing, “[J]udicial review is not available to 
check the decision of the highest appellate court; if it were the 
 
 66. David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 969, 974 (2008) 
A common law approach insists that judges are sharply limited by 
precedent, but it does not suggest that precedent always determines 
the outcome of a case—obviously not—and, more important, a 
common law approach to constitutional interpretation allows 
judges and other interpreters to say that part of the reason for a 
result is that that result is more fair or is better policy. 
 67. See Susan R. Burgess, Beyond Instrumental Politics: The New 
Institutionalism, Legal Rhetoric, & Judicial Supremacy, 25 POLITY 445, 455 
(1993) (“Leading scholars as disparate as Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin, 
Robert Bork, John Hart Ely, and Michael Perry disagree about what the Court 
should say when it speaks, but they agree that once spoken, the Court’s words 
are final.”). 
 68. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 404 (2013). 
 69. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 69–71 (1985). 
 70. DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 73. 
 71. Id. at 74. 
 72. Id. at 12. 
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court would not be the highest”;73 to rephrase it, the highest 
court is the highest court because it is the highest court. That 
begs the question why judicial error cannot or should not be 
appealed to the legislature in cases of abuse of judicial authority. 
Where the government is by the people, through their elected 
representatives, it at least follows that their voice is relevant to 
the evolving meaning of the Constitution. Dworkin postulates 
that, “It might seem natural to say at least this: the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses give the court no power to strike 
down statutes that no reasonable person could think deeply 
unjust.”74 But what mechanism there is to overturn judicial 
overreaching, Dworkin does not say. 
Dworkin’s view of judges’ articulation of law is idealistic. 
They are not to be willful, subjective, nor capricious. 
Adjudication, rather, involves moral and political considerations 
that do not allow for arbitrary judgements.75 A judge’s function 
is as a moral philosopher who makes value judgements while 
seeking to articulate the “objectively best account that can be 
given of all the concepts, values, and ideas that the law instructs 
him to consider.”76 Like legislators, judges are prone to errors. 
As Dworkin recognizes, even “an authoritative court makes the 
wrong decision about what the democratic conditions require.”77 
Under a system where judicial interpretation is inevitably 
subject to judges’ human foibles and lapses, absolute finality is 
neither the only nor necessarily the best approach. Legislative 
judgements should be measured against fundamental principles 
of constitutional law’s commitment to equality, liberty, and the 
general welfare. The judicial branch need not always hold a 
trump card in the matter. A balance is needed between the 
branches rather than automatic conclusiveness. The 
proportional evaluation of judicial review and legislative policies 
 
 73. Ronald Dworkin, Response, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1086 (2010). 
 74. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 210 (2006). 
 75. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 235–58 (1986) (explaining that a 
judge “must choose between eligible interpretations . . . from the standpoint of 
political morality”). 
 76. Jeremy Waldron, Planning for Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 883, 900 
(2011) (discussing Dworkin’s views on objective adjudication that involve 
judicial moral sensibility and precedential analogy). 
 77. DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 32. 
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is possible, as I show in Part IV, in one that allows for a review 
protecting rights against the overreaching of both courts and 
Congress. There is no fault to wanting courts to be “forums of 
principle,”78 but that is merely ideal. In practice, there are many 
circumstances under which decisions are based on principles of 
inequality. Ableman v. Booth,79 Dred Scott,80 Plessy v. 
Ferguson,81 and Bradwell v. Illinois,82 come most readily to 
mind. And some mechanism should allow popular majorities to 
overturn adjudications detrimental to equal rights, autonomy, 
and the common good. 
Having discussed leading theories of judicial review, Parts 
II and III next turn to existing doctrines. Neither renunciation 
of judicial review—as Tushnet and Waldron advocate83—nor 
judicial exclusivity—as Strauss and Dworkin suggest84—suffice. 
Separation-of-powers concerns inform observers and courts 
about when heightened scrutiny is appropriate and, on the other 
hand, when rational basis review best achieves principles of 
constitutional reconstruction. The Court’s mixed record on civil 
rights demonstrates that a balance of power is needed for the 
judiciary and Congress to help achieve the aspirations of 
Reconstruction. 
 
 78. RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 
33 (1985). 
 79. 62 U.S. 506, 522–26 (1858) (holding constitutional the Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1850 with its provision requiring state citizens to help to arrest 
fugitives). 
 80. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404, 426 (1857) (denying both the validity of 
Black citizenship and the congressional authority to prohibit state sanctioned 
forms of racial discrimination). 
 81. 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (deciding that forced segregation on public 
carriers did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
 82. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873) (holding that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant the federal 
government the authority to control states’ licensing regulations, even when 
they discriminated between men and women). 
 83. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text. 
 84. See supra notes 28–55, 68–72 and accompanying text. 
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II. RECONSTRUCTED JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
Tushnet and Waldron go too far in resisting judicial review 
given the many cases that protect individual rights.85 The cases 
that follow demonstrate how popular interests can be advanced 
by judicial interpretation. They show the relevance of judicial 
review to the people’s interest in a government ruled by the legal 
principle consistent with equal protection and republican 
governance. The judiciary has played an important role in 
advancing the constitutional policies behind the Reconstruction 
Amendments. 
To that end, the Supreme Court has articulated key 
doctrines to safeguard fundamental rights, equality, and voting 
privileges through analysis of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments. This Part parses judicial reliance on 
Reconstruction principles, structures, and norms. It surveys 
judicial reliance on Reconstruction Amendment principles to 
strengthen rights, equality, and voting doctrines. 
A. Early Developments 
The Court’s power to closely scrutinize matters concerning 
autonomy, equality, and franchise stems from three conditions 
the Court first set forth in footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.86 That identified three circumstances under which 
the Court might subject law “to more exacting judicial scrutiny 
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment 
than are most other types of legislation.”87 Special constitutional 
concerns arise, wrote Justice Stone for the Supreme Court, 
when at stake are “specific prohibition of the Constitution, such 
as those of the first ten Amendments,” “prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities,” or “political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”88 That 
statement, which is directly relevant to a Reconstruction 
Amendment-based review, reflects textual, structural, 
 
 85. See supra Part I.A. 
 86. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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normative, and historical reasons for closely scrutinizing state 
actions. 
The Court maintains constitutional norms as a necessary 
component of representative democracy by checking majorities 
from abusing individuals’ equal rights to enjoy personal 
autonomy and general welfare. Justice Blackmun characterized 
the famous footnote’s formula as being the grand “moment the 
Court began constructing modern equal protection doctrine.”89 
The footnote 4 signaled even broader implications for civil rights 
and civil liberties enforcement. Professor Richard Fallon 
explains that the footnote set in motion a complicated system of 
analysis: “Even after triggering rights are identified, 
determining whether they are outweighed by competing 
governmental interests often requires a serious, sometimes 
difficult comparison of individual interests with potentially 
countervailing governmental interests.”90 
Pursuant to the Carolene Products formula, the Warren 
Court developed a body of law for reviewing state actions that 
encroached on personal liberties, just treatment, and political 
engagement. A variety of cases relied on searching scrutiny to 
overturn special burdens on marginalized groups with claims for 
equality, substantive liberty, and effective political 
representation.91 In those cases, judicial review operates as a 
corrective mechanism returning power to people whose vital 
concerns have not been met through ordinary political channels. 
In an early case of increased judicial review, the Court did 
not rely on heightened scrutiny in Brown v. Board of Education; 
rather, it categorically found that segregated public schools 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.92 With that holding the Court was empowered to 
act against state practices degrading persons because of race. 
 
 89. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 23 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see id. at 17 
(majority opinion) (holding that the state university violated the Supremacy 
Clause by policy, denying in-state tuition to nonimmigrant resident aliens). 
 90. FALLON, supra note 51, at 149 (criticizing Professor John Hart Ely’s 
interpretation of Carolene Products as being “thin”). 
 91. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 n.5 (1954) (noting 
that the Fourteenth Amendment provides a “positive immunity” from 
“unfriendly legislation”). 
 92. See id. at 495. 
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Many progressive decisions followed. The Court relied on 
substantive due process and equal protection review to strike 
down bans against the sale of contraceptives.93 The same 
autonomy principle led the Court to rely on competent reason to 
find a rational basis with a bite to strike anti-gay sodomy laws94 
and restrictions on same-sex marriage.95 The Court held 
unconstitutional laws inconsistent with the enjoyment of 
political speech.96 Out of the synthetic recipe first articulated by 
Carolene Products Co. also came decisions against unfair 
apportionment of voters.97 “One person, one vote” became a key 
principle against elective inequalities.98 
I turn to several examples to illustrate how the Court’s role 
in adjudicating civil rights cases is justified on the context of 
American constitutional reconstruction. After exploring these 
cases, the Article turns in Part III to judicial encroachment on 
congressional Reconstruction powers. 
B. Heightened Judicial Review 
The fourth footnote of Carolene Products identified three 
justifications for non-deferential judicial review: the protection 
of equality, the security of fundamental rights, and the 
operation of representative political processes.99 Later holdings 
established that in cases where those concerns arise, judges are 
to rely on strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or some 
 
 93. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972) (finding 
unconstitutional a contraception statute that violated the equal protection of 
unmarried people). 
 94. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding that the 
Texas anti-sodomy statute furthered “no legitimate state interest”). 
 95. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (noting that the 
laws against same-sex couples “abridge central precepts of equality”). 
 96. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1964) 
(establishing an “actual malice” requirement for defamation against public 
officials). 
 97. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–11 (1962). 
 98. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (noting that the Equal 
Protection Clause requires “substantially equal state legislative 
representation for all citizens”). 
 99. See supra notes 86–98 and accompanying text. 
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categorical rule.100 On closer examination, constitutional 
analysis relies not on simple tests but on text, history, value, 
and precedent. These factors identify whether heightened 
review is warranted to protect a discrete and insular group, a 
right secured by the Constitution, or representative 
government. The cases below help demonstrate why rejection of 
judicial review, for which Mark Tushnet and Jeremy Waldron 
argue,101 would be an unwarranted disruption of judicial and 
legislative equilibrium. 
1. Fundamental Rights 
The Supreme Court first altered Carolene Products’s “more 
exacting judicial scrutiny” into “strict scrutiny,” which it first 
articulated in Skinner v. Oklahoma102 to strike down a criminal 
sterilization statute.103 But Justice Douglas, who wrote the 
majority opinion in the latter, left to later cases to parse out the 
meaning of “strict scrutiny” review.104 The structure of the test 
was fleshed out further in the 1969 Shapiro v. Thompson105 
opinion, where the Court relied on strict scrutiny to strike down 
 
 100. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1267, 1303–05, 1312–14 (2007) (comparing strict scrutiny analyses and 
categories). 
 101. See supra Part I. 
 102. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 103. See id. at 541. Chief Justice Stone and Justice Jackson allude to 
Carolene Products in their concurrences. See id. at 544 (Stone, C.J., 
concurring); id. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring) (agreeing that the proposed 
Act “denies equal protection of the law”). While Carolene Products rejected 
substantive due process analysis, which had by the Second New Deal gone into 
disrepute, it offered a way of retaining judicial relevance in matters involving 
normative judgments. See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of 
Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 894–95 (2009) (arguing that footnote 
four of Carolene Products “was an effort to bury substantive due process while 
maintaining a role for the courts”). The Court returned to substantive due 
process in the late 1960s. See Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: Constitutional 
Meaning and “Tradition”, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 261, 280 (2007). But see Jesse 
H. Choper & Stephen F. Ross, The Political Process, Equal Protection, and 
Substantive Due Process, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 983, 1012 (2018) (arguing that 
“Carolene Products . . . was in part a substantive due process case”). 
 104. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 543 (leaving the precise solution of the equal 
protection issue to the Oklahoma court). 
 105. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
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a restriction on the “fundamental right of interstate 
movement.”106 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in the 
latter case, found the state lacked compelling state reasons to 
exclude indigents from entering the state seeking to receive 
valuable public resources.107 While the narrow tailoring test had 
not yet made its way into the Shapiro opinion, there was a 
resonance to Justice Stone’s awareness in Carolene Products 
that the Court must give more careful consideration to 
legislation that negatively impacts individuals’ abilities to 
exercise rights under “the first ten Amendments, which are 
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the 
Fourteenth.”108 
More than merely a doctrinal test, Shapiro announced the 
structural vision of Reconstruction that incorporated the Bill of 
Rights. The majority asserted that the right to travel existed by 
“nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of 
personal liberty.”109 But it mistakenly traced that right to 
antebellum precedent written by Chief Justice Taney, “We are 
all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same 
community, must have the right to pass and repass through 
every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own 
states.”110 The Reconstruction Amendments altered the federal 
structure of government by expanding the rights of Americans 
irrespective of race. The history of Reconstruction is critical to 
defining the right to travel. 
As early as the 1864 Senate debates on the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, passed pursuant to Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment 
authority, Senator John Sherman of Ohio argued that liberty 
was more than mere emancipation and extended to the right to 
travel.111 This counterposed the antebellum status of 
 
 106. Id. at 638. 
 107. See id. at 631, 634. 
 108. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 109. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629. 
 110. Id. at 630 (quoting The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 
(1849)). 
 111. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1865) (“This clause gives 
to the citizen of Massachusetts, whatever may be his color, the right of a citizen 
of South Carolina, to come and go precisely like any other citizen.”). 
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restrictions on slave travel.112 Travel was among the rights 
guaranteed by constitutional removal of the badges and 
incidents of slavery.113 
Moreover, the Thirteenth Amendment granted federal 
powers beyond the realm of chattel slavery. Even free Southern 
Blacks lived in a world so legally constricted by racial 
domination that it offered only a deceptive shadow of freedom. 
Their movement was severely restricted. Some Southern states 
forbade free Blacks from entering at all, coupling the prohibition 
with the imposition of severe fines against offenders. Prior to 
the Civil War, South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Alabama were among states that prohibited free Black sailors 
to disembark from ships.114 North Carolina forbade them from 
traveling beyond the county where they resided.115 Even the 
paternalistic form of kindness Southerners gave their slaves 
was not afforded to free Blacks. They lived under constant 
surveillance, lest they become educated and organized enough 
to rebel. Laws throughout the South prohibited them from 
assembling, not even for religious services or charitable 
purposes.116 Free Blacks often worked in the most menial jobs, 
 
 112. See KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE 
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 192–236 (1956) (discussing a range of restrictions under 
slavery codes). 
 113. See HERMAN BELZ, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 
AND FREEDMEN’S RIGHTS, 1861 TO 1866, at 120 (1976); CONG. GLOBE, 42nd 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 844 (1872); id. at 3192 (relating the right to travel to national 
citizenship). 
 114. See MICHAEL A. SCHOEPPNER, MORAL CONTAGION: BLACK ATLANTIC 
SAILORS, CITIZENSHIP, AND DIPLOMACY IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 146 (2019); 
MICHELE REID-VAZQUEZ, THE YEAR OF THE LASH 73 (2011) (describing South 
Carolina’s “Negro Seaman’s Act” which gave port cities the authority to 
incarcerate Black sailors when they arrived in port until their ship was ready 
to disembark); JUDITH KELLEHER SCHAFER, BECOMING FREE, REMAINING FREE 
132–33 (2003); Daniel J. Flanigan, The Criminal Law of Slavery and Freedom, 
1800–1868, at 206 (1973) (Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University) (on file with the 
Rice University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection). 
 115. STEPHEN A. VINCENT, SOUTHERN SEED, NORTHERN SOIL 11 (1999). 
 116. See id. (noting that following Nat Turner’s rebellion, North Carolina 
restricted free Blacks from preaching the gospel and required that Black 
religious services occur “under White supervision”). 
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excluded from professions either by cultural or statutory 
barriers.117 
These nominally free people suffered from many of the same 
burdens inflicted on slaves, and the Thirteenth Amendment 
sought to end restrictions on movement and their concomitant 
denigrations. Its sweep, therefore, stretched to Northern 
discriminations as well since free Blacks in the North were 
saddled with many of the same discriminations as their 
Southern counterparts. During his U.S. tour, Alexis de 
Tocqueville remarked that race prejudice was stronger in the 
North than it was in the South.118 As with free Blacks in the 
South, the movement of Northern Blacks was severely curtailed. 
The Court’s power to review restrictions on travel comes from 
the historical, structural, and ethical change wrought by the 
Reconstruction Amendments. 
In 1859, Oregon was the only free state to enter the Union 
with a constitutional prohibition against Blacks residing 
there.119 In 1851, an Iowa statute prohibited any free Blacks 
from entering the state or subjected them to fines, but in a show 
of faux compassion the state allowed law-abiding Blacks living 
there to remain.120 Iowa followed an established line of Northern 
legislation designed to keep Blacks from moving about the 
expanding country. Ohio, from 1803, effectively limited the 
number of free Blacks who could enter because it was practically 
impossible for them to pay the required $500 bond of good 
 
 117. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 216–17 (2d ed. 
1956). 
 118. See James L. Crouthamel, Tocqueville’s South, 2 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 
381, 396 (1982); Richard W. Resh, Alexis De Tocqueville and the Negro: 
Democracy in America Reconsidered, 48 J. NEGRO HIST. 251, 256–57 (1963) 
(“Tocqueville described the free Negro’s burdens in his discussion of the 
tyranny of public opinion. Theoretically the free Negro could vote, but an 
attempt to cast the ballot would result in reprisals.”). 
 119. See 2 JOHN C. HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 217 (Negro Univ. Press 1968) (1862); HENRY H. SIMMS, A 
DECADE OF SECTIONAL CONTROVERSY, 1851–1861, at 129 (Greenwood Press 
1978) (1942) (explaining that in addition to not being permitted to reside in 
the state, Blacks “could not hold any real estate, maintain a suit or make a 
contract”). 
 120. See 2 HURD, supra note 119, at 177 (explaining that “free negroes” 
living in Iowa are allowed to remain in the state so long as they “have[] 
complied with the laws now in force”); SIMMS, supra note 119, at 129. 
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behavior.121 The Illinois Constitution of 1848, prohibited entry 
to free Black folks.122 An 1853 Illinois law gave this provision 
effect, making it a misdemeanor for Blacks and “mulattos” to 
enter the state for the purpose of residing there and subjecting 
them to a fine or, if unable to pay the $100 to $500 dollars, sale 
to forced labor to pay off the fine and court costs.123 Then, just a 
month before President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, 
during the state’s 1862 constitutional convention, Illinois 
adopted a constitutional article prohibiting Blacks from 
immigrating to the state, which passed by a majority of 100,590 
popular votes.124 Similar exclusionary provisions were found in 
Indiana law.125 Northern Blacks needed the liberating 
provisions of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendment almost as much as Southern slaves. 
Reconstruction altered the federal structure of government 
by giving Blacks free egress and ingress into states. Shapiro and 
similar right to travel cases reflect the history and structure of 
Reconstruction.126 They identify the national norm of free 
interstate passage, ingress, egress, migration, welfare, and fair 
dealing. In Saenz v. Roe,127 the Court recognized the right to 
travel as a feature of the Privileges or Immunities and Privileges 
 
 121. SIMMS, supra note 119, at 128; see FRANK U. QUILLIN, THE COLOR LINE 
IN OHIO: A HISTORY OF RACE PREJUDICE IN A TYPICAL NORTHERN STATE 20–24, 
38–40, 88 (1913). 
 122. SIMMS, supra note 119, at 128. 
 123. See 2 HURD, supra note 119, at 136 (explaining that after facing this 
initial punishment, the free Black person must remove themselves from the 
state or continue to face fines or forced labor). 
 124. See ALLAN NEVINS, ORDEAL OF THE UNION, SELECTED CHAPTERS 39 
(1973); N. DWIGHT HARRIS, THE HISTORY OF NEGRO SERVITUDE IN ILLINOIS AND 
OF THE SLAVERY AGITATION IN THAT STATE, 1719–1864, at 235–36, 239 (1904). 
 125. See 2 HURD, supra note 119, at 136 (citing an 1853 Indiana law which 
made it a “[m]isdemeanor for negro or mulatto, bond or free, to come [to the 
state] with intention of residing,” and that such individual may be “prosecuted 
and fined or sold, for time, for fine and cost”); NEVINS, supra note 124, at 39. 
 126. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Saenz v. Roe, 
526 U.S. 489 (1999); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
 127. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
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and Immunities Clauses.128 In future cases the Court should 
more clearly detail the historical basis of fundamental rights, 
such as travel. 
2. Equal Protection 
The Equal Protection Clause added norms into 
constitutional structure that the Court has effectively adopted 
into doctrine. The history of the Clause speaks to significant 
constitutional change, including judicial review to enforce 
norms of fairness its brief text implies. The second founders did 
not fathom its breadth of applications from race, to sexual 
orientation, and handicap status. 
Nevertheless, the historical record evinces some, albeit 
limited, understanding of the Equal Rights Clause’s breadth of 
application. Even congressional opponents of the Clause, such 
as Representative Samuel Randall, conceived the extent to 
which the Fourteenth Amendment portended change to the 
Constitution: “The first section proposes to make an equality in 
every respect between the two races, notwithstanding the policy 
of discrimination which has hitherto been exclusively exercised 
by the States.”129 The power to enjoin inequality applied to all 
three branches. It expanded legislative authority to pass 
statutes, the executive’s to regulate, and the judiciary’s to 
review. Judicial review became crucial for identifying 
discriminatory actions and for fashioning equitable remedies. 
Enforcement powers have evolved but remain grounded in the 
nation’s founding norm in the Declaration of Independence “that 
all men are created equal.”130 Following Reconstruction, the 
Declaration’s statements about human rights, equality, and 
self-government establish, what Senator Charles Sumner 
called, a “sovereign rule of interpretation.”131 
Structural changes lay dormant until the Supreme Court, 
in Brown v. Board of Education, expanded the interpretive 
 
 128. See id. at 500–03 (discussing three types of the right to travel in the 
contexts of both the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Privileges or 
Immunities Clauses). 
 129. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2530 (1866). 
 130. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 131. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 828 (1872). 
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value of the Equal Protection Clause.132 Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes infamously called that portion of the Constitution, “the 
usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”133 The fault lay 
in the Court itself for so diminishing the value of the Equal 
Protection Clause in earlier cases such as Slaughter-House134 
and the Civil Rights Cases.135 Holmes failed to recognize that 
the Equal Protection Clause was part of this broader effort, 
linked to emancipation and abolitionism before it, which pushed 
to constitutionalize equal status under law. Anti-slavery 
movements had moved for radical change to constitutional 
order—the elimination of slavery—while searching for change 
consistent with the Declaration of Independence. Those 
principles foreshadowed the civil rights movement’s reliance on 
the Court by organizations like the NAACP.136 Charles Sumner 
in the late 1840s had argued that separate but unequal 
education is stigmatic.137 Chief Justice Warren adopted a 
similarly normative concept into his finding that segregated 
schools violate equal protection and communicated a “sense of 
inferiority [that] affects the motivation of a child to learn.”138 
In Warren’s hands in Brown, the Clause was recognized for 
its normative statement. Its integration of equality into doctrine 
led to desegregation throughout society.139 He explained the 
 
 132. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits segregation 
in public schools). 
 133. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). In the case, Holmes’s refusal 
to recognize Carrie Buck’s Equal Protection claim led to one of the most 
distasteful holdings in the history of the Supreme Court. See id. at 207 
(asserting that state sterilization did not violate a woman’s rights because 
“three generations of imbeciles are enough”). 
 134. See 83 U.S. 36, 81–82 (1872) (construing the Equal Protection Clause 
to not apply to any actions outside of direct discrimination by a State against 
Black individuals as a class). 
 135. See infra Part III.B. 
 136. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, WE SHALL OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND THE LAW 202–05 (2008) [hereinafter WE SHALL OVERCOME]. 
 137. See Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 203 (1849). 
 138. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 139. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 61–62 (1963) (per curiam) 
(relying on Brown to find that the segregation of public facilities, such as 
courtrooms, is constitutionally impermissible); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 
U.S. 350, 351, 353 (1962) (per curiam) (holding that public segregation in 
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point in a speech, which identified how he regarded the 
integration of principle, history, and structure: 
What is the American ideal? It is simply and precisely stated 
thusly in the Declaration of Independence—”We hold these 
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable 
rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness. []” . . . This noble language, fortified by the 
implementing language of the 14th Amendment, makes the 
picture complete.140 
For him an aspiration had been made substantive by the 
Reconstruction. 
It is also no wonder that recent cases interweave equality 
and autonomy interests. For example, in Obergefell Justice 
Kennedy engaged in a sophisticated explanation, writing that 
the right to raise a family safeguards self-definition and 
fairness.141 The interweaving of freedom and equality in the case 
is consistent with the historical record. As Kenneth Karst points 
out, 
[t]here was no serious effort to differentiate the functions of 
the various clauses—privileges and immunities, due process, 
equal protection—of section 1 of the proposed amendment. 
With or without the privileges and immunities clause, the 
section in its entirety was taken to guarantee equality in the 
enjoyment of the rights of citizenship.142 
 
airport dining facilities violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Holmes v. City 
of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93, 94–95 (5th Cir. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) 
(per curiam) (vacating a decision that had declared the segregation of public 
golf courses to be constitutional); Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. 
City, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th Cir. 1955), aff’d, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) 
(finding that racial segregation of public beaches and bathhouses was not 
constitutionally permissible); Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204, 205–06 (E.D. 
La. 1963), aff’d, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam) (granting injunctive relief for 
the desegregation of a city auditorium). 
 140. Civil Rights & the Warren Court, EBONY, Feb. 1, 1970, at 28. 
 141. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 673–75, 681 (2015) (“These 
considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental 
right inherent in the liberty of the person.”). 
 142. Kenneth L. Karst, Forward: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1977). 
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The idea of the Equal Protection Clause, and the rest of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, was to make citizenship a matter of 
entitlements and guaranteed rights of free people. The newly 
acquired power provided for judicial review, just as it did for 
legislative enforcement, sufficient to address various 
infringements on individuals’ rights. 
3.  Political Processes 
The ability of the Court to secure fundamental rights, 
equality, and the franchise demonstrate that Professors 
Tushnet and Waldron overplay their hands in arguing that the 
judiciary is undemocratic.143 We have already seen that the 
Supreme Court has advanced principles of democracy as to 
fundamental rights and equality.144 So too with voting. The 
Fifteenth Amendment dramatically altered the structure of 
American government. History helps to understand this as do 
the norms behind its ratification. 
Ratification occurred in a country riddled with voting 
inequality. A national solution was necessary. The Court has 
relied on reconstruction powers to protect democratic 
participation. The point could be illustrated by a whole group of 
cases. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,145 for 
instance, ruled that voting rights are protected under the Equal 
Protection Clause.146 The Court used heightened scrutiny to 
recognize the “one person, one vote” principle even before 
Congress had adopted the Voting Rights Act of 1965.147 Warren 
thought Baker v. Carr148 was “the most vital decision” of his 
 
 143. See supra Part I.A. 
 144. See supra Part II.B.1–2. 
 145. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 146. See id. at 622 (striking down a New York law that only allowed 
individuals to vote in school district elections if they owned “taxable real 
property” in the district or were the parents of “children enrolled in the local 
public schools”). 
 147. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of 
political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth 
Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”). 
 148. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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career.149 Justice Brennan wrote the opinion, holding for the 
first time malapportionment justiciable.150 The Court followed 
with Wesberry v. Sanders151 where the Court held population 
disparities among districts “grossly discriminate[ ] against 
voters.”152 
Indeed in some areas, such as politically manipulative 
gerrymandering, the Court might exert even greater democratic 
oversight. Davis v. Bandemer153 first recognized political 
gerrymandering to be justiciable and not a purely political 
matter.154 Yet, a lack of judicial standards has plagued this area 
of law. In Vieth v. Jubelirer,155 for example, five Justices found 
no judicially manageable standard to evaluate the 
constitutionality of a gerrymander.156 More to date, as we will 
see in Part III.C.2, the Court in a 2019 case, Rucho v. Common 
Cause,157 almost abrogated its power to protect against political 
gerrymandering.158 
III. JUDICIAL OVERREACH IN MATTERS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
Part II discussed several doctrinal realizations of 
Reconstruction. There is reason, nevertheless, not to adopt the 
strong judicial review found in Strauss and Dworkin.159 The 
Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments 
 
 149. POLLY PRICE, JUDGE RICHARD S. ARNOLD 57 (2019). 
 150. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 237 (“We conclude that the complaint’s 
allegations of a denial of equal protection present a justiciable constitutional 
cause of action . . . . The right asserted is within the reach of judicial protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 151. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 152. Id. at 7–9; see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560–61 (1964). 
 153. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 154. See id. at 143. 
 155. 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 156. See id. at 293; id. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 157. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 158. See id. at 2506–07 (“[T]he fact that such gerrymandering is 
incompatible with democratic principles . . . does not mean that the solution 
lies with the federal judiciary. We conclude that partisan gerrymandering 
claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.” 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 159. See supra Part I.B. 
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empower Congress with discretionary power over civil rights 
and civil liberties. Judicial veto over such reasonable policies 
works against the written text, aspirations, ideals, principles of 
justice, and equality concerns. 
This Part of the Article scrutinizes legislative authority to 
fulfill the aspirations of liberty, equality, and franchise through 
reasonable legislation. Several cases recognize congressional 
authority to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. The 
enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments (§ 2 of 
the Thirteenth, § 5 of the Fourteenth, and § 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendments, each granting enforcement powers) explicitly 
augmented Congress’s powers to promulgate civil rights and 
civil liberties legislation.160 
Judicial deference is adhered to in the landmark Thirteenth 
Amendment case, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer,161 which upheld a 
law protecting property rights against private discrimination.162 
The Court reviewed and upheld congressional use of the § 2 
enforcement power.163 The opinion, drafted by Justice Stewart, 
found a civil rights law, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, to be “necessary and 
proper” for preventing discrimination in real estate 
transactions.164 The Court recognized that the text of the 
Amendment explicitly gave Congress broad latitude to enact 
laws against legislatively identified rights violations: “Surely 
Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment 
rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents 
of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination 
into effective legislation.”165 Stewart extensively surveyed 
historical sources, finding evidence that the Thirteenth 
Amendment extended congressional authority to protect 
 
 160. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. 
amend. XV, § 2. 
 161. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 162. Id. at 440–41. 
 163. Id. at 438–44. 
 164. See id. at 439 (ruling that the Enabling Clause “clothed ‘Congress 
with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and 
incidents of slavery in the United States’” (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 
U.S. 3, 20 (1883))). 
 165. Id. at 440. 
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property rights.166 Then, the Court in Runyon v. McCrary167 
further deferred to congressional authority to criminalize 
private racial discrimination in contractual matters.168 
For a time, the Court was likewise deferential about 
Congress’s reliance on Fourteenth Amendment, § 5 authority. 
Katzenbach v. Morgan169 found that “[b]y including § 5 the 
draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific provision 
applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad 
powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”170 The 
Amendment does not require congressional complacency; 
nothing in the text, history, or structure of § 5 indicates that it 
narrowed congressional powers to those first identified by the 
Court. To the contrary, its wording indicates enhanced 
legislative leadership in ethical efforts to advance liberty and 
equality for all. The liberal Justice Brennan wrote in Morgan 
that the Court is not exclusive in the expansion of rights. 
Congress can rely on § 5 power to strengthen protections of 
rights; to think otherwise would be to relegate the legislative 
branch “to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state 
laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge 
unconstitutional.”171 “[B]y including § 5,” the Reconstruction 
Congress “sought to grant to Congress . . . the same broad 
powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.”172 On 
this there was conservative and liberal consensus; Justice 
Brennan in Morgan and Justice Stewart in Jones identified the 
enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments to be 
grants of broad authority to advance policies for enacting civil 
rights-related laws.173 Similarly, a separate lead opinion written 
 
 166. See id. at 423–28. 
 167. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 168. See id. at 163, 168–73 (finding that Congress had the authority to 
prohibit private schools from excluding qualified children purely because they 
are Black). 
 169. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 170. Id. at 650. 
 171. Id. at 648–49. 
 172. Id. at 650. 
 173. See id. (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819), 
which established the current scope of Necessary and Proper Clause 
authority). 
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by Justice Black drew attention to the Fifteenth Amendment 
grant of power to Congress: “[E]xemption from discrimination in 
the exercise of the elective franchise.”174 Black, in Terry v. 
Adams,175 found that the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth 
Amendment granted a more robust “congressional power to 
protect this new constitutional right” than even the rational 
basis authority long related to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.176 
Those cases bucked the more common pattern of judicial 
supremacy, rooted in antebellum jurisprudence, which came at 
the expense of congressional initiative, experimentation, and 
representation.177 The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts chose 
interpretive routes that denied the expansive reach of 
Congress’s enforcement authority. In recent years, the Court 
has thwarted legislative efforts to provide federal redress for 
gender-motivated violence,178 to create monetary penalties for 
states’ violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act179 and 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act,180 and to reform 
campaign finance laws.181 The Article now turns to cases that 
limited congressional authority over fundamental rights and 
liberties. While we previously saw that Professors Waldron’s 
and Tushnet’s opposition to judicial review would stymie Court 
efforts to advance constitutional reconstruction, this Part 
 
 174. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 467 (1953). 
 175. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
 176. Id. at 468; see Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 294 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (writing of precedent that “compared Congress’ 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power to its broad authority under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause”). 
 177. Repeated rejection of congressionally defined rights puts into doubt 
Professor Barry Friedman’s claim that the Court tends to follow the popular 
will. See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 2596, 2599 (2003) (“[O]ur system is one of popular constitutionalism, in 
that judicial interpretations of the Constitution reflect popular will over 
time.”). 
 178. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). 
 179. See Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). 
 180. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000). 
 181. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 
(2010); McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 227 (2014) 
(plurality opinion). 
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demonstrates that strong judicial review, of the type advocated 
by Professors Strauss and Dworkin, would undermine 
legislative enforcement of structural, historical, principled, and 
textual aspects of constitutional reconstruction. 
A.  Antebellum Misdirection 
During the antebellum period, Dred Scott v. Sanford 
protected the institution of chattel slavery against congressional 
authority. It came to be the quintessential example of judicial 
overreach into congressional prerogatives. Its outcome 
illustrates why the Reconstruction Amendments were needed to 
secure legislative enforcement in the aftermath of Civil War. 
The case held unconstitutional the Missouri Compromise Act, 
which had prohibited slavery from extending into northern 
territory of the United States.182 
Chief Justice Taney wrote the fractured opinion. Dred Scott 
included six concurrences and two dissents. He infamously 
wrote that persons of African heritage could never be U.S. 
citizens and that the Declaration of Independence’s statement 
of natural rights applied only to Whites.183 Taney furthermore 
rejected the claim that Black slaves who had lived part of their 
lives in free states, as had Dred Scott and his wife, Harriet, could 
vindicate their freedom in federal courts.184 
Taney’s belief that he could resolve from the bench the 
sectional conflict over slavery proved gravely mistaken.185 
Southern Congressmen relied on Taney’s lead opinion186 to rail 
 
 182. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857). 
 183. Id. at 407, 410. 
 184. Id. at 400. 
 185. See Earl M. Maltz, The Last Angry Man: Benjamin Robbins Curtis 
and the Dred Scott Case, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 272 (2007); JAMES F. SIMON, 
LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE PRESIDENT’S 
WAR POWERS 127 (2006) (“[Taney] thought that he was performing a great 
service for his country by eliminating the divisive issues of African-American 
citizenship and the Missouri Compromise from the national debate. Like 
President Buchanan, he hoped that the Court’s decision would silence 
abolitionist agitation and preserve the Union.”). 
 186. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404, 426 (overturning the Missouri 
Compromise and stating “[t]he Government of the United States had no right 
to interfere for any other purpose but that of protecting the rights of the [slave] 
owner”). 
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against claims that Congress had sole administration over the 
Missouri Territory.187 Rather than permanently resolving the 
question of slavery, the Dred Scott opinion proved to be a 
principal catalyst for civil war. 
Without doing necessary historical research into the 
subject, the Chief Justice claimed that neither the framers nor 
the states had meant for Black inhabitants to be citizens.188 
Writing in dissent, Justice Curtis exposed Taney’s misleading 
fallacy: At the time of the founding, free Blacks had been 
citizens of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New 
Jersey, and North Carolina.189 African Americans also had 
voting privileges in those states.190 Relying on this history, 
Curtis argued that Blacks had then gained national citizenship 
by virtue of their state citizenship.191 His view, however, did not 
extend to persons of African descent who had throughout their 
entire lives resided in slave states. 
The Court proved a dangerous branch when its final 
decision denied the universal enjoyment of rights. By the time 
of Reconstruction, it was clear that Congress needed to be a 
check against judicial error on matters of such gravity as liberty, 
equality, and citizenship. Taney was wrong to claim that the 
framers thought the Declaration of Independence did not apply 
to persons of African descent.192 While that narrow-mindedness 
 
 187. See Anthony V. Baker, The Authors of All Our Troubles—The Press, 
the Supreme Court, and the Civil War, 8 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 29, 57 (2000); Stuart 
A. Streichler, Justice Curtis’s Dissent in the Dred Scott Case: An Interpretive 
Study, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 509, 539 (1997). 
 188. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411 (“Two clauses in the Constitution which 
point directly and specifically to the negro race as a separate class of persons, 
and show clearly that they were not regarded as a portion of the people or 
citizens of the Government then formed.”). 
 189. Id. at 572–73 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 576. 
 192. Taney discounted the Declaration of Independence’s statement of 
universal values. He wrote that if the framers had wanted to include Blacks 
in the documents statement of national principles, then “the conduct of the 
distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would have 
been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted.” Id. 
at 410 (majority opinion). 
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was certainly true of some of the documents’ signers, it certainly 
was untrue of the Continental Congress as a whole. 
Examination of revolutionary pamphlets, correspondences, 
and news stories reveals a more nuanced record.193 An 
influential American jurist wrote in 1778 that the rights people 
“possess at birth are equal, and of the same kind.”194 John 
Adams, a member of the committee of four assigned by the 
Second Continental Congress to draft the Declaration, stated 
that inalienable rights are divinely granted and they cannot be 
“repealed or restrained by human laws” because they are 
antecedent “to all earthly government.”195 Benjamin Franklin, 
who was probably the best known of the Declaration’s signers, 
went on to be President of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society.196 
Furthermore, even the writings of Southern luminaries of the 
caliber of George Mason and Patrick Henry evince realization 
that their hypocritical retention of slaves violated the natural 
law philosophy of the Revolution.197 In the North, emancipation 
laws gave practical application to the Declaration’s statement of 
 
 193. For a discussion of how the Declaration of Independence’s recognition 
of inalienable human rights informed the founding generation’s debates about 
abolishing slavery, see TSESIS, supra note 33, at 65–74 (discussing 
contemporaries who believed in Black innate inferiority). For representative 
voices of that racist genre, see 2 EDWARD LONG, THE HISTORY OF JAMAICA OR, 
GENERAL SURVEY OF THE ANTIENT AND MODERN STATE OF THAT ISLAND 353–73 
(2d ed., Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1970) (1774) (taxonomizing Blacks somewhere 
between humans and simians); see also JOHN DUNLAP, PERSONAL SLAVERY 
ESTABLISHED, BY THE SUFFRAGES OF CUSTOM AND RIGHT REASON 18 
(Philadelphia 1773). 
 194. Result of the Convention of Delegates Holden at Ipswich in the 
County of Essex (1778), reprinted in THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF 
THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359, 365 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1861). 
 195. JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW, in 3 
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 477, 480 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1851) (1782). 
 196. For a sophisticated and nuanced discussion of Franklin and U.S. 
slavery, see DAVID WALDSTREICHER, RUNAWAY AMERICA: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 
SLAVERY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 225 (1st ed. 2004). 
 197. Letter from Patrick Henry to Robert Pleasants (Jan. 18, 1773), in 
GEORGE S. BROOKES, FRIEND ANTHONY BENEZET 443–44 (1937) (“Would any one 
believe that I am Master of Slaves of my own purchase! I am drawn along by 
ye general Inconvenience of living without them; I will not, I cannot justify 
it.”); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 370 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) (writing an indicting statement of Col. George Mason of his 
own hypocrisy by stating that “every master of slaves is born a petty tyrant”). 
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inalienable rights.198 Dred Scott contained a series of errors that 
could only be rectified though constitutional change in favor of 
congressional enforcement. 
B. Postbellum Reconstruction 
Reconstruction was partly a response to Dred Scott, but, far 
more so, it was an affirmation of federal interests in matters 
involving liberty, equality, and voting. Ratification of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments augmented 
congressional powers. Congress was given explicit, enumerated 
powers to enforce principles of inalienable rights that from the 
nation’s founding had been embedded in the Declaration of 
Independence and Preamble to the Constitution.199 They altered 
the structure of American governance by empowering Congress 
to enforce laws that would prevent the Court from again 
undercutting federal protections of rights.200 
By adopting the Reconstruction Amendments, the nation 
committed itself to throwing off the yoke of slavery and incidents 
of bondage; securing due process, equal protection, the 
privileges or immunities of citizenship; and advancing the 
franchise. But by 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme 
Court had overstepped its Article III bounds, donned the mantle 
of interpretive supremacy, and effectively thwarted the 
reconstruction of civil rights and civil liberties in the United 
States. 
The holding remains, never having been overturned, a 
landmark for narrow reading of congressional enforcement 
powers. The Civil Rights Cases curtailed congressional 
authority even more forcefully than Dred Scott. The Court held 
 
 198. See WE SHALL OVERCOME, supra note 136, at 32. 
 199. Professor Charles Black pointed out that the Declaration of 
Independence and the Preamble are “[t]he two best sources” for “striving 
toward rational consistency, . . . keeping the rules of legal decision in tune 
with the society’s structures and relationships, . . . [and] reaching toward 
higher goals.” CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., ON READING AND USING THE NINTH 
AMENDMENT, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW 187, 192 (Myers S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman 
eds., 1985). 
 200. See TSESIS, supra note 33, at 179–201. 
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the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be unconstitutional.201 The full 
name of the statute identified the breadth of its commitment to 
racial justice: An Act To Protect All Citizens in Their Civil and 
Legal Rights.202 The first section entitled “all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States” to “the full and equal 
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and 
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, 
and other places of public amusement.”203 Other portions of the 
law created civil and criminal penalties; it also granted 
exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts.204 Congress had relied on 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers to 
make a structural break from the antebellum model of 
federalism, wherein states enjoyed exclusive control over 
property and civil rights. Those two Amendments prohibited 
state laws from interfering with the enjoyment of public places 
of accommodation, irrespective of local and state prejudices.205 
They were principled reforms that undertook to end the long 
history of racial prejudice. Instead of recognizing them to be 
augmentations of congressional powers, the Court narrowed the 
Amendments’ significance, reach, and force. Thereby, the 
majority rendered postbellum changes to the Constitution 
almost dead letters. 
The Civil Rights Cases thwarted radical constitutional 
revision of federalism.206 Ordinary contract, property, criminal, 
 
 201. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883). 
 202. Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, §§ 1–4. 
 203. Id. § 1. 
 204. Id. §§ 2–3. 
 205. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth 
Amendment Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 263 (2005) 
[T]he framers of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . understood the 
Fourteenth Amendment, at a minimum, as a delegation to Congress 
of the plenary power to define and enforce in the federal courts the 
substantive rights of U.S. citizens that they had just exercised in 
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
 206. Reconstruction had come to a near halt by the time the cases that 
challenged the 1875 Act had reached the Justices. Parts of the South had 
turned to new methods of oppression after the abolition of slavery. Citizenship 
rights were curtailed through a mix of private customs that included the 
sharecropping, segregation, peonage, and convict lease. JACQUELINE JONES, 
THE DISPOSSESSED: AMERICA’S UNDERCLASSES FROM CIVIL WAR TO THE PRESENT 
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and family matters remained within states’ general powers, but 
such laws could no longer be used to prevent anyone from the 
full and equal enjoyment of enumerated businesses.207 The 
Court blew an indelible hole in the structure of constitutional 
reconstruction. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
empowered Congress to pass civil rights legislation without 
judicial interference. At a minimum, those two amendments 
sought to prevent another national trauma brought on by Dred 
Scott, in which the Supreme Court had cut the legs out from a 
the Missouri Compromise of 1820. 
Consolidated into the Civil Rights Cases were five separate 
causes of action. Each contested various forms of segregation in 
public accommodations, including access to a hotel and railroad 
coach.208 The Court found the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be 
facially unconstitutional. It held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not grant Congress the authority to pass a law 
that regulated private conduct.209 The Court found the 1883 law 
was not “corrective legislation.”210 Because the majority found it 
was “primary and direct,” it held Congress had “superseded and 
displaced state legislation.”211 
 
107 (1992). See generally DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY (1996); 
ALEX LICHTENSTEIN, TWICE THE WORK OF FREE LABOR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF CONVICT LABOR IN THE NEW SOUTH (1996); KARIN A. SHAPIRO, A NEW SOUTH 
REBELLION: THE BATTLE AGAINST CONVICT LABOR IN THE TENNESSEE COAL 
FIELDS, 1871–1896 (1998). 
 207. See Civil Rights Act of 1875 § 1. 
 208. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 4–5. For more context see James 
Madison, San Francisco Theatrical Memories, MUSEUM CITY S.F., https://
perma.cc/76GU-TC77 (concerning Maguire’s Opera House); Grand History: In 
the Beginning, GRAND OSHKOSH, https://perma.cc/YEQ2-DRJB (detailing the 
history of the Grand Opera House). 
 209. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (“It is State action of a 
particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights 
is not the subject-matter of the amendment.”). 
 210. Id. at 13. 
 211. Id. at 19 (“This is not corrective legislation; it is primary and direct; 
it takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of 
admission to inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes 
and displaces state legislation on the same subject, or only allows it permissive 
force.”). The state action doctrine, which prohibits Congress from relying on 
the Fourteenth Amendment to directly regulate private conduct, eventually 
prompted Congress to look to the Commerce Clause to pass civil rights laws 
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The Court refused to defer to Congress’s five years’ worth of 
investigations and hearings, which had illustrated the harms of 
segregation and the need for federal remedies.212 Justice 
Bradley, who wrote the majority opinion, also denied that 
segregation and racial discrimination by businesses were 
continued incidents of slavery.213 
The lone dissent by Justice Harlan took the majority to 
task, writing that federal legislation could regulate 
discrimination by state-licensed companies.214 Harlan compared 
the Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases with that of Dred 
Scott because both so significantly encroached on congressional 
powers. As Justice Harlan stated in dissent, the majority 
prevented Congress from acting at “its own discretion, and 
independently of the action or non-action of the states.”215 
Harlan argued that businesses could be regulated by federal 
civil rights legislation. That is, the Act controlled economic 
intercourse, not private relations. 
The law provided federal protections to advance the 
reconstruction values of racial equality and meaningful liberty. 
But the majority shifted away from the values of constitutional 
change, foreclosing the nation’s ability to enforce civil 
reconstruction. The Court had not only failed to advance the 
changed Constitution, it prevented Congress from doing so. The 
results of the opinion were entirely contrary to the abolitionist 
vision from which those two amendments sprang. 
 
and the Court to channel much of its civil rights decisions through the 
Commerce Clause rather than the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments. 
 212. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 984–1092 (1995) (detailing congressional 
debates preceding passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875). 
 213. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883). 
 214. See id. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce that 
amendment, by appropriate legislation, may enact laws to protect 
that people against the deprivation, because of their race, of any 
civil rights granted to other freemen in the same State; and such 
legislation may be of a direct and primary character, operating upon 
States, their officers and agents, and also upon, at least, such 
individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and wield 
power and authority under the state. 
 215. Id. at 57. 
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The eight-Justice majority did more than put a stop to 
nationwide desegregation. It diminished congressional 
authority despite the explicit grant of lawmaking powers in the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The history of 
systemic national racism that led to ratification of liberty and 
equality norms was ignored. Outcry about the Supreme Court’s 
self-aggrandizing opinion was caustic. A newspaper columnist 
wrote that after the holding in the Civil Rights Cases “it is safe 
to say that no other decision of the court since the famous Dred 
Scott decision . . . has created so much excitement and 
discussion.”216 The analogy between the two cases was not lost 
on other authors in the months after the 1883 decision.217 
The Supreme Court had put a nail into the heart of 
Reconstruction. And southern states were glad to take 
advantage of the Court’s axe job to congressional power, tearing 
the heart out of the constitutional reconstruction, finding 
unconstitutional the crown jewel of Reconstruction. From there 
the nation slid into further separation of the races. Less than 
half a month after the Civil Rights Cases decision was 
announced, the Governor of Texas asked rail companies to 
separate Black and White passengers.218 The Supreme Court’s 
effects on national reconstruction became evident almost 
immediately. By 1891, various Jim Crow laws had been passed 
in Florida (1887), Mississippi (1888), Texas (1889), Louisiana 
(1890), Alabama (1891), Arkansas (1891), Kentucky (1891), and 
Georgia (1891).219 
Additional cases of the post-Reconstruction period also 
relied on a strong judicial finality to undermine federal civil 
rights. During that era, the Court positioned itself as a powerful 
opponent to legislative authority. To thwart congressional 
action, the Court became a bulwark for state power, which 
deprived citizens of the ability to effectively petition 
representatives to end racial discrimination. 
 
 216. THE STEVENS POINT JOURNAL (Stevens Point, WI), Oct. 27, 1883, at 2. 
 217. See, e.g., There Is No Reason To Doubt . . . , ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS 
(Denver, Colorado), Oct. 21, 1883, at 2. 
 218. See Norman J. Colman, COLMAN’S RURAL WORLD, Nov. 1, 1883, at 4, 
https://perma.cc/HJ2K-6ZGN (PDF). 
 219. C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877–1913, at 
211– 12 (1951). 
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United States v. Cruikshank220 involved an appeal from 
three convictions under the First Enforcement Act of 1870, 
popularly known as the Civil Rights Act of 1870 or the First Ku 
Klux Klan Act.221 The Justice Department secured convictions 
for terrorist acts perpetrated against Black protestors who had 
gathered at a local courthouse to protest the outcome of a 
municipal election.222 Seventy to 165 freemen and three White 
men were murdered in the melee. The White militia set fire to 
the courthouse and shot or captured protestors who fled the 
conflagration. Many of those captured were marched away and 
later executed.223 
The Supreme Court overturned all three convictions, 
holding no one accountable for the racial injustice.224 Chief 
Justice Waite, writing for the majority, found the government’s 
complaints to be deficient.225 While the Court recognized a 
national right to peaceful assembly,226 it foreclosed reliance on 
congressional policy to punish privately perpetrated racial 
violence.227 The Court left enforcement of civil rights to the 
 
 220.  92 U.S. 542 (1876). 
 221. Id. at 43–44; see 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (“An Act to enforce the Right of 
Citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union, and 
for other Purposes.”); the small number was disappointing after the 
government had secured nearly one hundred indictments. ROBERT J. 
KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 176–77 
(1985). 
 222. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 43–44. 
 223. See JAMES K. HOGUE, UNCIVIL WAR: FIVE NEW ORLEANS STREET 
BATTLES AND THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION 109–11 (2006); 
LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK POWER, 
WHITE TERROR AND THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION 109–10 (2008). 
 224. The jury had acquitted six other defendants. See James Gray Pope, 
Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876) Belongs at the 
Heart of Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 385 (2014) 
(“Cruikshank played a crucial role in terminating Reconstruction and 
launching the one-party, segregationist regime of ‘Jim Crow’ that prevailed in 
the South until the 1960s.”). 
 225. Despite the momentous nature of the case, Waite found that the 
indictments were incomplete because they did not enumerate the civil rights 
that the federal government sought to vindicate. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 
552–53. 
 226. See id. at 552–53. 
 227. See id. at 554 
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exclusive control of states, which was meaningless where law 
enforcement agents sometimes participated in vigilante violence 
or refused to mobilize adequate police protections against racist 
attackers.228 Judicial finality, in Cruikshank, amounted to the 
further establishment of a states’ rights doctrine that prevented 
federal authorities from quelling racially motivated violence. It 
rejected a broad reading of the nation’s changed relationship 
between the states and federal government, which had 
expanded national standards for the enforcement of civil rights. 
Other cases also weakened Congress’s Reconstruction 
powers. The Court even undercut the legislature’s power to 
safeguard voting in the federal elections. United States v. 
Reese229 held that the Fifteenth Amendment does not secure the 
right to vote,230 a decision with lasting repercussions.231 Reese 
struck down a criminal federal statute that prohibited state 
elections officials from denying the right to vote to eligible 
persons.232 
 
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and 
from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws; but it adds nothing to the rights of one citizen 
as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty 
against any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental 
rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society. 
 228. See id. at 553. 
 229. 92 U.S. 214 (1875). 
 230. See id. at 217 (“The Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of 
suffrage upon any one. It prevents the States, or the United States, however, 
from giving preference, in this particular, to one citizen of the United States 
over another on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”). 
 231. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The individual citizen has 
no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the 
United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide 
election . . . .”); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (“Being 
unanimously of the opinion that the Constitution of the United States does not 
confer the right of suffrage upon any one . . . .”). 
 232. See 16 Stat. 140. While the majority in Reese claimed the statute was 
not limited to the language of the Fifteenth Amendment—which prohibits 
discrimination in franchise based on race, color, and prior condition of 
servitude—the text of the statute explicitly states those three conditions. Id. 
§§ 1, 2 (“[All persons eligible] shall be entitled and allowed to vote at all such 
elections, without distinction of race, color or previous condition of 
servitude . . . .”). 
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A final example will demonstrate how inimical the 
postbellum Supreme Court was in jettisoning federal civil rights 
initiatives. As with the other cases in this section, it 
demonstrates why congressional oversight is necessary to 
prevent Justices from undermining legislative efforts to advance 
the general welfare. United States v. Harris233 held Congress 
had exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment § 5 authority by 
passing a section of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 that was 
“directed exclusively against the action of private persons, 
without reference to the laws of the State or their 
administration by her officers,” and therefore “not warranted by 
any clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.”234 In consequence, Congress was left to regulating 
only direct actions by government officials, their policies, or 
some law.235 Here too, as Jack Balkin has pointed out, the Court 
prevents Congress from identifying what private acts have a 
close enough nexus to state action—such as government 
contracting and transportation companies—to warrant 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement.236 The power to pass 
federal law recognizing civil violations was upended. 
C.  Rehnquist & Roberts Courts’ Restraints on Legislative 
Powers 
1.  Rehnquist Court 
Several Rehnquist Court precedents further imbedded the 
strong version of judicial finality. We have already seen that 
part of this must be attributed to an absolute reading of Cooper 
v. Aaron.237 Professor Alexander Bickel hyperbolically critiqued 
 
 233. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
 234. Id. at 640. 
 235. See id. at 643. 
 236. See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1801, 1856–60 (2010). 
 237. For a discussion on Cooper, see supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
See also Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A 
Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 163 (1997) (“Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion adopted a startlingly strong view of judicial 
supremacy. . . . Boerne . . . adopted the most judge-centered view of 
constitutional law since Cooper v. Aaron.”). 
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the holding: “Whatever the Court lays down is right, even if 
wrong, because the Court and only the Court speaks in the name 
of the Constitution.”238 Professor Gerald Gunther (albeit with 
less sarcasm) also asserted that the Court in Cooper mistook 
“Marshall’s assertion [in Marbury] of judicial authority to 
interpret the Constitution with judicial exclusiveness.”239 The 
Rehnquist Court redefined Cooper, a case meant to assert 
judicial power to protect civil rights against states’ 
recalcitrance, into precedent for diminishing congressional 
reconstruction authority in City of Boerne v. Flores. 
The holding and reasoning of Boerne demonstrate how the 
modern Court augmented its power as sole interpreter of the 
reconstructed Constitution. It relegated Congress to a reactive 
role, a sort of small brother rather than a coequal branch of 
government.240 This violated simple checks and balances as the 
enforcement powers of the Fourteenth Amendment granted to 
national legislators. The Boerne majority found that even when 
Congress acted pursuant to an enumerated constitutional right, 
free exercise of religion in the First Amendment, it overstepped 
its enforcement power.241 This makes it much more difficult 
than Katzenbach v. Morgan had envisioned for Congress to 
identify rational means to achieve textually grounded 
constitutional objectives.242 The majority, drafted by Justice 
Kennedy, held that a significant portion of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was unconstitutional because 
it was “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive 
object that it [could not] be understood as responsive to, or 
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”243 
 
 238. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 264 (1962). 
 239. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A 
Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 25 n.155 (1964). 
 240. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (stating that 
Congress has no power to interpret its enforcement authority, provided under 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 241. See id. 
 242. For a study of core constitutional principles see generally ALEXANDER 
TSESIS, CONSTITUTIONAL ETHOS (Oxford Univ. Press 2017). 
 243. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
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Boerne relied on the holdings in the Civil Rights Cases and 
United States v. Harris (not bothering to mention how those 
cases helped to drive a stake into the civil rights movement of 
the late-nineteenth century) for the postulate that Congress is 
limited to remedying past patterns of state discrimination.244 
Kennedy found lawmakers have no independent authority for 
enforcing fundamental rights.245 Just as in the late nineteenth 
century, the Court augmented its interpretive power to the 
detriment of Congress’s enforcement of religious liberties 
against state encroachments. Professor Jack Balkin notes that 
the Court lacked any structural, textual, or historical reasons to 
thereby limit Congress’s § 5 enforcement power.246 
As things stand, the Supreme Court continues interpreting 
the Fourteenth Amendment as a restraint rather than a broad 
grant of congressional powers sufficient to prevent judicial 
overreach of the type quintessentially evident in Dred Scott. 
Congress passed the RFRA to expand the fundamental 
right to exercise religion, which is guaranteed under the First 
Amendment.247 The statute required courts to rely on strict 
judicial scrutiny in reviewing alleged burdens on the exercise of 
religious freedoms. That standard of review sought to displace 
the Court’s use of rational basis scrutiny to review laws of 
general applicability that had only an incidental effect on 
religious worship.248 Boerne denied Congress the ability to act 
on its initiative, relegating the nation’s lawmakers to a remedial 
role rather than treating them as members of a coequal branch 
 
 244. See id. at 532. 
 245. See id. at 520 (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s history confirms the 
remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause.”); id. at 
524 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)); id. at 525 (relying on 
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883)). 
 246. See Balkin, supra note 236, at 1815. 
 247. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 (“Legislation which alters the 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the 
Clause.”). 
 248. Congress had sought to overturn a previous Supreme Court case, 
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and to reinstate the strict 
scrutiny test from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See H.R. Rep. No. 
103-88, at 14 (1993) (recommending the passage of RFRA to reinstate strict 
scrutiny in freedom of religion cases); S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 12–13 (1993) 
(same). 
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of government. This Rehnquist Court holding only recognized 
lawmakers’ Fourteenth Amendment powers to make laws 
responsive to the Court’s prior interpretations.249 In the words 
of the Court, Congress has no mandate “to decree the substance 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”250 
This effectively disarmed Congress from being able to pass 
initiatives more protective of religious liberty than the Court 
had previously identified. As Professor Michael McConnell 
points out, Congress was not trying to define its own powers 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather it sought to correct 
what it regarded to be the Court’s mistaken interpretation of the 
Free Exercise Clause.251 
The Court expanded its judicial finality rationale, striking 
down bipartisan civil rights legislation.252 In Boerne, the Court 
reinforced its claim to be the only branch of government able to 
identify the scope of constitutional reconstruction, this despite 
the Fourteenth Amendment § 5’s explicit grant of enforcement 
power to the national legislature rather than the judiciary. The 
holding intruded into Congress’s ability to pass uniform laws 
narrowly tailored to safeguard religious liberties. In effect, the 
unelected branch devalued the fundamental liberty of religion 
in favor of a judicially contrived test. In the name of preserving 
the Constitution, the Court abridged authority that the text of 
the Fourteenth Amendment granted to legislators. 
Boerne returned to the post-Reconstruction understanding 
of legislative authority and away from the Warren Court’s more 
deferential approach to congressional civil rights and civil 
liberties initiatives. The Court abandoned recognition of 
congressional authority to advance but not curtail rights. The 
majority explicitly denied its Civil Rights Era conclusion in 
Morgan that “§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is a positive 
grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its 
 
 249. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524–25, 536. 
 250. Id. at 519. 
 251. See McConnell, supra note 237, at 173. 
 252. The statute was sponsored by Senators Kennedy and Hatch and 
passed in the Senate on a vote of 97–3 and in the House by unanimous voice 
vote. William L. Saunders et al., Religious Liberty After Hobby Lobby: A Panel 
of the 2014 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, 48 CONN. L. REV. 
969, 974 (2016). 
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discretion in determining whether and what legislation is 
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”253 In Boerne, to the contrary, the Court construed 
§ 5 as a narrow grant of legislative authority, while asserting 
broad judicial powers.254 
The Court’s reasoning took a constitutional provision, 
containing a legislative enforcement provision and designed to 
prevent overreaching similarly disastrous as Dred Scott, and 
found it inadequate to secure religious liberty, guaranteed by 
the First Amendment and incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The Boerne doctrine of exclusivity in interpretation and 
congressional remediation under § 5 hampers congressional 
initiatives on how and when it should exercise its Fourteenth 
Amendment authority. In effect, short of resorting to Article V 
mechanisms for amending the Constitution, judicial exclusivity 
in interpretation stripped the enforcement mechanism built into 
the Fourteenth Amendment to advance equal protection of 
individual rights and ability to advance the general welfare.255 
Section 5, which authorizes Congress to enforce the Due Process 
Clause over matters like the free exercise of religion, was 
stripped down by a judicial power grab.256 The Court is certainly 
responsible for interpreting the Constitution in toto, including 
substantive due process, equal protection, and citizenship in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But § 5 is also a clear grant of 
 
 253. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
 254. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997). 
 255. See Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for 
the Common Good, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1613 (2013). 
 256. See Robin West, Constitutional Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply 
to Reva Siegel, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1478 n.40 (2006) (asserting that “the U.S. 
Congress has an obligation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment” 
to ensure states uphold the “duty to protect all citizens’ natural rights”); cf. 
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment 
Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 187, 263 (2005) 
[T]he framers of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . understood the 
Fourteenth Amendment, at a minimum, as a delegation to Congress 
of the plenary power to define and enforce in the federal courts the 
substantive rights of U.S. citizens that they had just exercised in 
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 
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increased authority to Congress to pass federal civil rights laws 
without judicial interference. Rather than follow constitutional 
text, the Boerne Court also created a loosely defined congruence 
and proportionality test, granting itself final power to review 
policy decisions better left to political rather than judicial fact 
gathering.257 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause 
logically goes to the core function of representative governance. 
The Second Founding elevated the people’s ability to petition 
their elected officials to define rights intrinsic to liberty, equality 
and citizenship. 
The Constitution nowhere gives the judiciary exclusive 
authority to define the full range of federal civil rights, such as 
free exercise of religion, nor does it reserve that authority for 
unelected judges. The judiciary’s role in preventing majorities 
from undermining minorities’ constitutional interests is not 
implicated where Congress passes safeguards of essential 
interests in matters such as worship. 
The Court further eroded legislative, Reconstruction 
authority in United States v. Morrison, where it struck down the 
civil remedy provided by the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA).258 The punishments provided under the federal law did 
not limit state criminal enforcement, but created federal, civil 
 
 257. See F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of 
Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1487 (2010) 
Under the current regime, the courts have control over the scope of 
their power and the power of the legislature. The Court has 
exercised that power in controversial ways. For example, in City of 
Boerne the Court limited Congress’s power to enforce the 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that the Court, 
not Congress, has the power to determine the scope of rights 
protected by the Amendment. 
William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. 
L. REV. 87, 97 n.27 (2001) 
[W]hile the existence of judicial review has been well established 
since . . . the task of assessing societal conditions and determining 
policy responses, particularly where the Constitution allocates 
lawmaking power to Congress to regulate commerce or implement 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, has been allocated not 
to the courts, but to Congress. 
 258. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617, 627 (2000). 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 897 
 
cause of action for gender-motivated crimes.259 As it had in 
Boerne, the majority in Morrison adopted and gave a 
contemporary gloss to the state action doctrine that was a 
deciding factor in the Civil Rights Cases, Cruikshank, and 
Harris.260 Those cases had undermined congressional authority 
in the post-Reconstruction terms, and the Court relied on them 
as precedents in Morrison.261 The majority found the private 
remedy to be unconstitutional because it targeted private rather 
than state action.262 Morrison is yet another example of the state 
action doctrine, a contrivance of the Court’s interpretation, 
relied on to thwart congressional reliance on its enforcement 
power. 
Congress had relied on two enumerated powers to pass the 
law; here I’m only dealing with the use of Fourteenth 
Amendment § 5 authority, not the Commerce Clause.263 The 
case followed Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test to 
deny the operation of VAWA, which had been passed by 
bipartisan congressional majorities.264 The Act created a private 
federal cause of action for the victims of sexual and domestic 
violence.265 Morrison further augmented judicial power at the 
expense of the legislature by prohibiting Congress to identify 
substantive rights, allowing it only to remedy wrongs that the 
Court had previously defined.266 The Court left ambiguous how 
broadly civil rights violations must occur in states before 
 
 259. See id. at 605–06. 
 260. See id. at 621 (“Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored 
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only 
state action.”). 
 261. Id. at 621–23. 
 262. Id. at 621. 
 263. Id. at 627 (“Congress’s effort in § 13981 to provide a federal civil 
remedy can be sustained neither under the Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 264. See supra note 257 and accompanying text. 
 265. The majority in Morrison continued to limit Congress’s § 5 power to 
the enactment of laws congruent and proportional between the means chosen 
and the policy end to be achieved. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625–26 (citing Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
639 (1999)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997). 
 266. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625–26 (stating that Congress’s power is 
limited to prophylactic legislation). 
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Congress can pass congruent and proportional laws against 
them. 
Without being able to act directly against a select group of 
bad state actors, Morrison severely hampered Congress’s ability 
to pass laws for the general welfare under § 5. Prior to passing 
VAWA, Congress created a massive legislative record, which 
established the importance of a national solution to many 
instances of states’ inadequate responses to gender-based 
violence.267 The collected “mountain of data” included findings 
of twenty-one state task forces and nine congressional 
hearings.268 But even that did not convince the Court of the 
commensurability between the federal remedy and the finding 
that states regularly failed to adequately prosecute sexual 
violence. 
Moreover, VAWA enjoyed federal and state support, 
showing the extent to which it was well within the bounds of 
social morality as it has developed in the aftermath of 
Reconstruction.269 The majority’s expression of interpretive 
exclusivity discounted congressional policy and outright rejected 
benign congressional reasoning. 
Additional Rehnquist Court decisions further expanded the 
scope of judicial authority to thwart congressional reliance on 
beyond constitutionally reasonable grounds. Kimel v. Florida 
Board of Regents270 held that state sovereign immunity 
prohibited Congress from relying on its § 5 authority to create a 
remedy for state employees to sue for monetary damages under 
 
 267. See id. at 653–54 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining the array of 
states’ executive and legislative branch entities that support the passage of 
VAWA). 
 268. Id. at 628–31. 
 269. That social morality against gender discrimination is evident from the 
development of Equal Protection cases. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 558 (1996) (holding Virginia Military Institute’s categorical refusal to 
accept female applicants unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (striking down Oklahoma law on 
equal protection grounds for arbitrarily differentiating between males and 
females); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (ruling that law 
distinguishing between male and female administrators of estates violated 
Equal Protection Clause). 
 270. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
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the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).271 The 
majority relied on a doctrine of sovereign immunity, which it 
revived through the Eleventh Amendment, to thwart Congress’s 
rational use of Reconstruction power for the benefit of elderly 
Americans.272 A law based on the conscience of the nation 
toward its older citizens became largely ineffective because of 
judicial veto. The Court simply interpreted the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity to expand state rights and judicial, 
interpretive prerogatives. Given its self-proclaimed interpretive 
supremacy, the Court rendered an interpretation that 
effectively superseded the people’s sovereign right, through 
their representatives, to pass effective civil rights legislation.273 
The Court likewise denied Congress the right to rely on its 
power to abide by national norms for the treatment of the 
disabled in University of Alabama v. Garrett,274 where it found 
unconstitutional a key provision of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).275 There too, as in Boerne and Kimel, the 
Court stifled congressional use of Fourteenth Amendment 
authority.276 Thereby, the Court weakened a law of such 
consequence that President George H. W. Bush likened it to the 
Declaration of Independence.277 
 
 271. See id. at 82–83 (“Applying the same ‘congruence and proportionality’ 
test in these cases, we conclude that the ADEA is not ‘appropriate legislation’ 
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); id.at 91. 
 272. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 183–84 (1996) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that while “[t]he Hans doctrine was 
erroneous . . . it has not previously proven to be unworkable or to conflict with 
later doctrine” and hence is a part of stare decisis, but arguing that where 
Congress clearly abrogated that sovereign immunity, as it did with the ADEA, 
the restriction against federal courts hearing private suits does not govern); 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1890) (holding that states are immune 
from federal suits brought by private parties who are citizens of that state); cf. 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 733 (1999) (“Although the sovereign immunity 
of the States derives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the 
structure and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists 
today by constitutional design.”). 
 273. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 92. 
 274. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
 275. See id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 276. Id. at 374–75. 
 277. Presidential Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1166 (July 26, 1990). 
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2.  Roberts Court 
The Roberts Court has continued to expand the judicial grip 
on interpretive exclusivity. In the area of free speech, for 
instance, the lack of deference is reminiscent of Lochner era 
overreach.278 The Court has also struck state consumer- and 
health-related regulations with little explanation for 
superseding federalist principles.279 This Part of the Article 
focuses only on congressional power over racial voting 
discrimination; and in this area, the Court has also continued to 
bevel away at congressional powers provided by the 
Reconstruction Amendments. 
In Shelby County v. Holder, a majority turned back one of 
Congress’s efforts to rely on Fifteenth Amendment enforcement 
power to regulate state and local jurisdictions with histories of 
racial discrimination.280 The Court held that the 2006 coverage 
formula, found in § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), was 
unconstitutional because it identified and listed covered states 
based on data the majority found to be outdated.281 Following 
the decision, formerly designated voting districts can change 
voting laws without prior notice to the U.S. Attorney General. 
After Shelby, § 2 of the VRA continues to permit individual 
litigants to file suits challenging race-based restrictions on 
 
 278. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
30, 109–16 (1993). For arguments that protection of commercial speech 
revivified Lochner-era intrusions into legislative economic prerogatives see 
Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due 
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 8, 40 (1979). 
 279. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 558–59, 565 (2011) 
(striking as unconstitutional a Vermont state law protecting health-related 
privacy); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 496–97 (2014) (finding a law 
protecting women’s access to reproductive services to be unconstitutional). 
 280. 570 U.S. 529, 556 (2013) (“[I]t would have been irrational to base 
coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such tests have been 
illegal since that time. But that is exactly what Congress has done.”). 
 281. See id. at 557 (“Congress could have updated the coverage formula at 
that time, but did not do so. Its failure to act leaves us today with no choice 
but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional.”). 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 901 
 
voting.282 Such private § 2 litigation, however, is more difficult 
to pursue because it is highly costly and time-consuming.283 
The states, municipalities, and counties covered by the 
§ 4(b) formula had been required to obtain preclear permission 
from the federal government before altering their political 
districts.284 Congress had created a list based on their ongoing 
histories of voter discrimination.285 “Congress knew that some 
of the States . . . had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of 
contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of 
perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal 
court decrees.”286 Nevertheless, the Court held that the 2006 
re-authorization of the statute failed to account for listed 
jurisdictions’ made strides at ending voter discrimination.287 
Such drafting imprecision the majority regarded to be 
congressional overreach that violated the “fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty” among the states.288 
The dissent to Shelby County pointed out that the majority 
misstated the record. As Justice Ginsburg demonstrated, 
Congress had collected extensive evidence to re-pass the 2006 
preclearance requirement.289 She pointed out that legislative 
 
 282. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)–(b). 
 283. See NAACP Legal Def. Fund, THE COST (IN TIME, MONEY, AND 
BURDEN) OF SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT LITIGATION, https://perma.cc
/4U34-VA2Y (PDF) (“A huge amount of resources is needed to bring a Section 
2 complaint.”); Hearing Before Subcomm. on the Const., 109th Cong. 65 (2006), 
https://perma.cc/2N6Q-QYYD (“I would estimate that the cost of a vote 
dilution case . . . runs close to half a million dollars in costs.”); Hearing Before 
Subcomm. on the Const., 109th Cong. 73 (2005), https://perma.cc/2YW3-Z9B6 
(“A full section 2 case litigated just through the end of trial is at least 2 years. 
You can’t do it any faster than that. There are always the outlyers [sic], the 
15-year cases. But 2 to 5 years is a rough average.”). 
 284. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 534 (“[Section] 4 of the Act applied 
that requirement only to some States—an equally dramatic departure from 
the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty.”). 
 285. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 §§ 3(c), 4(b). 
 286. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966). 
 287. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 547. 
 288. Id. at 544. 
 289. See id. at 564–65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As the 1982 
reauthorization approached its 2007 expiration date, Congress again 
considered whether the VRA’s preclearance mechanism remained an 
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policy had been made before the backdrop of hearings that the 
Senate had conducted in April, June, and July 2006. Thereafter, 
the bill was debated on the floor of the House, where “extensive 
hearings” had also been conducted.290 The findings were, 
moreover, consistent with holdings of liability for violating 
minority voters’ rights in decisions rendered by courts in covered 
jurisdictions.291 
By relying on its Fifteenth Amendment power, Congress 
had unambiguously enforced the American people’s will to 
safeguard voting equality by reauthorizing § 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA) in 2006. The House voted for it by a huge 
margin, 390 yeas to 33 nays, and the Senate voted 98–0 in 
favor.292 In this age of political gridlock, such bipartisan 
consensus is rare. It demonstrates the civic possibilities of 
constitutional reconstruction with increased federal 
enforcement authority. But the Court relied on judicial 
exclusivity to intrude against express enforcement power 
granted to Congress by the Fifteenth Amendment for ending 
racial barriers to voting.293 
The judicial doctrine of equal state sovereignty for the 
Court in Shelby County displaced explicit § 2 power for Congress 
to identify and implement the means for ending certain voting 
rights violations. This holding was counter to the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s alteration to the structure of constitutional 
government. It granted to national lawmakers the ability to 
pass legislation rationally designed to end enumerated forms of 
 
appropriate response to the problem of voting discrimination in covered 
jurisdictions.”). 
 290. Id. 
 291. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920–22 (1995); Hunter v. 
Underwood, 730 F.2d 614, 617 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); 
Brown v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs., 706 F. 2d 1103, 1107 (11th Cir. 1983); Common 
Cause v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2005); Dillard v. City 
of Foley, 926 F. Supp. 1053, 1067 (M.D. Ala. 1995). For a fuller list of cases see 
152 CONG. REC. S7954 (July 20, 2006). 
 292. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 565 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 293. See id. at 556 (majority opinion) (“It would have been irrational for 
Congress to distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 
40-year-old data, when today’s statistics tell an entirely different story.”). 
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 903 
 
voting discrimination.294 Its provisions granted Congress power 
to enforce laws against any state or locality that continues to 
deny the franchise to persons based on race. The text granted 
Congress the power to make racially conscious policies likely to 
rectify and remedy civic inequalities. As Chief Justice Warren 
articulated it, the Fifteenth Amendment principle is: “As 
against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any 
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of 
racial discrimination in voting.”295 It is this principle that Shelby 
County abrogated. 
The Fifteenth Amendment addition to the Constitution was 
consistent with another Reconstruction-era guarantee of “fair 
and effective representation for all citizens.”296 While the final 
Reconstruction Amendment did not guarantee a general right to 
vote,297 it empowered Congress to prevent states from denying 
political representation based on racially invidious 
qualifications. The risk that Congress will intrude into 
traditional areas of federalism are alleviated because of the 
Amendment’s exacting language.298 The VRA’s preclearance 
 
 294. As ratified, the Fifteenth Amendment proved inadequate to end many 
types of states’ interferences with voting. Senators Oliver Morton, Willard 
Warner, and Henry Wilson decried the failure to grant Congress the power to 
prevent states from deploying literacy, property, and educational 
qualifications to disfranchise Blacks. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong. 861–62 (1869) 
(Warner); id. at 863 (Morton); id. at 1626–27 (Wilson). Moreover, feminists, 
especially Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, decried the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s failure to secure women the vote. ERIC FONER, 
RECONSTRUCTION 447 (1988). 
 295. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966). 
 296. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (stated in the context of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 297. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The individual citizen has 
no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the 
United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide 
election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the 
electoral college.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 101 
(1973) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he right to vote in state elections has itself 
never been accorded the statute of an independent constitutional guarantee.”). 
 298. See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on 
Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1190–91 (2001) (“Section 2 [of the 
Fifteenth Amendment] could not possibly give rise to a legitimate fear that, if 
construed to require only McCulloch-style means-ends tailoring, it would 
functionally award Congress a virtually plenary police power.”). 
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requirement was consistent with the normative and structural 
changes to the Constitution that came in after a bloody civil war. 
The Fifteenth Amendment, as the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments before it, changed the federalist 
structure in favor of legislative authority to pass national laws 
safeguarding civil rights and civil liberties. At a minimum the 
Enforcement Clauses were drafted to give Congress power to act 
against state racial discrimination.299 Section 4(b) of the VRA 
served just that rational function.300 Review of the preclearance 
requirement should have received deferential review from the 
Court of the congressional enforcement of a law whose scope was 
limited to voting discriminations based on racial, color, and 
previous conditions status. Congress adhered to the 
Amendment’s textual restraints on its power to abide by the 
democratic principle of minority voting. Ginsburg pointed out 
that “Congress approached the 2006 reauthorization of the VRA 
with great care and seriousness,” in light of continuing voter 
discriminations in the State of Alabama, including in Shelby 
County.301 But the Shelby County majority depreciated and 
diminished congressional enforcement authority. 
The decision came at a time when Americans, especially 
those living in Black and Latino neighborhoods, have found it 
more difficult to locate a polling place to cast their ballots. 
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights reports that 
between 2012 and 2018 almost 1,700 polling stations were 
closed in states that had followed pre-clearance requirements.302 
 
 299. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325–36 (“[Section] 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment expressly declares that ‘Congress shall have power to enforce this 
article by appropriate legislation.’ By adding this authorization, the Framers 
indicated that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the 
rights created in § 1.”). 
 300. Frankly, strong arguments can be made for the most exacting 
scrutiny: that § 4(b) was a necessary means for government to achieve the 
compelling interest of preventing racial discrimination in the franchise. But 
more work would be needed to prove up that point than the rational scrutiny 
method in support of which this Article argues. 
 301. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 581 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 302. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUCATION FUND, DEMOCRACY 
DIVERTED: POLLING PLACE CLOSURE AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE, https://perma.cc
/24NA-9HSW (PDF). 
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Three battleground states of the 2020 election—Texas, Arizona, 
and Georgia—experienced the greatest number of closures.303 
In a case challenging two states’ gerrymandering schemes, 
Rucho v. Common Cause, the Court refused to even adjudicate 
to advance political equality in voting.304 Voters brought suits in 
North Carolina and Maryland, claiming that their states’ 
congressional districts were politically gerrymandered to dilute 
votes of the minority political party in both states.305 The 
majority refused to rule in favor of a First Amendment and 
Equal Protection challenge to two highly partisan voting district 
plans, one fashioned by a state’s Democratic majority and the 
other by a different state’s Republican majority.306 The Supreme 
Court refused to review partisan gerrymandering for lack of a 
judicially manageable standard.307 
The Court held the matter was non-justiciable.308 Among 
the findings, wrote Chief Justice Roberts, the Guarantee Clause 
does not provide a cognizable claim in this matter.309 Justice 
Kagan asserted in dissent that the majority was “throwing up 
its hands” without providing direction.310 
The doctrine of equal voting rights might have given the 
Rucho Court a starting point to draft a clearly articulated test 
for fairly designing voting districts. Indeed, the lower court had 
found that the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, 
 
 303. See A House Divided, ECONOMIST (Sept. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc
/QJ83-WRDJ. 
 304. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (“Excessive partisanship in districting 
leads to results that reasonably seem unjust. But the fact that such 
gerrymandering is ‘incompatible with democratic principles,’ does not mean 
that the solution lies with the federal judiciary.” (citation omitted)). 
 305. Id. at 2491. 
 306. Id. at 2506–07. 
 307. See id. at 2494, 2508 (finding lack of subject matter jurisdiction for 
lack of limits on a case and controversy capable of resolution through judicial 
process). 
 308. Id. 
 309. See id. at 2506; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. For an elaboration on 
Guarantee Clause relevance to gerrymandering review see generally David S. 
Louk, Reconstructing the Congressional Guarantee of Republican Government, 
73 VAND. L. REV. 673 (2020). 
 310. Lower federal courts had “largely converged on a standard for 
adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims.” Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2516 
(Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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and the Elections Clause are relevant to the adjudication of 
partisan gerrymandering claims.311 The majority in Rucho, 
however, held that the First Amendment does not supply “a 
serious standard for separating constitutional from 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.”312 The same claim 
of ambiguity might be leveled at every free speech issue resolved 
under the the First Amendment, given the paucity of its text. 
On the Fourteenth Amendment side, the Court’s firm holding to 
City of Boerne, placing the onus on Congress to pass statutes 
only when a judge finds the enforcement to be remedial and 
congruent and proportional, erodes the likelihood that 
congressional action against political gerrymandering, unlikely 
as it is in today’s political climate, will withstand judicial 
scrutiny.313 
Shelby County and Rucho stifle both congressional and 
judicial actions to guarantee voting and representative 
government under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
By not allowing Congress to take the lead in the former and not 
taking the lead in the latter, the Court hamstrung federal 
initiatives. Under both decisions Congress can intervene to 
protect equal and fair representation and to guard against group 
discrimination. The ratification process of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, to include the historical mode of analysis, makes 
clear the need for federal legislative policy.314 The Roberts 
Court, on the other hand, has (as had the Rehnquist Court 
before it) weakened the powers critical to reconstruction of 
federal government, affecting congressional initiatives to 
protect rights, equality, and voting.315 
 
 311. Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 597–98, 608–09 
(M.D.N.C. 2018); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. amend. I; id. art. I, § 4. 
 312. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2504–05. 
 313. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). For an 
extensive discussion of that case’s limitations on congressional enforcement 
see supra notes 240–241 and accompanying text. 
 314. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of 
Section 5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 109, 112 (2013) (detailing the “Reconstruction 
Republicans’” aims during debates on ratification). 
 315. The Court has also allowed states to undermine voting through 
restrictive initiatives. During the 2019–2020 term, in Raysor v. DeSantis, 
Justice Sotomayor wrote in dissent from denial of application to vacate stay 
that the majority “continues a trend of condoning disfranchisement,” No. 
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IV.  LEGISLATIVE RECONSTRUCTION 
Rather than the weak and strong forms of judicial review 
suggested by scholarship reviewed in Part I, what is needed is a 
balance of powers between the Supreme Court and Congress. 
Each can function as an independent branch of authority to 
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments. This Part reflects on 
the extent to which the judiciary must defer to federal policies 
that advance civil rights and civil liberties. It argues that as a 
matter of legislative prerogative and a vestige of Reconstruction 
history, Congress has authority to pass laws reasonably related 
to the enforcement of enumerated autonomy, equality, or voting 
rights. The Reconstruction Amendments empowered Congress, 
not the Court, to be the primary branch of government for 
identifying rights, setting policies, and promulgating laws 
consistent and implicit in their texts. Moreover, their 
substantive provisions—the prohibition against the incidents of 
slavery and involuntary servitude; the provisions on citizenship, 
privileges or immunities, due process, and equal protection; and 
the safeguards against racist voting requirements—are value 
rich. The powers of Congress to identify and pass laws affecting 
civil and civic rights are tied to the first principles of government 
found in the Declaration of Independence and Preamble to the 
Constitution. 
 
19A1071, 2020 WL 4006868, at *4 (U.S. July 16, 2020) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting from denial of application to vacate stay), making clear allusion to 
Shelby County. She criticized the Court’s decision in Raysor to allow a state 
law to effectively disenfranchise 800,000 otherwise-eligible voters. A state 
constitutional ballot initiative had granted voting privileges to persons who 
had completed the term of their sentence for felony conviction, except persons 
convicted of murder and sex offense. Jones v. DeSantis, No. 19CV300, 2020 
WL 2618062, at *3 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2020) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4), 
hearing en banc ordered sub nom. McCoy v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003, 
2020 WL 4012843 (11th Cir. July 1, 2020). The majority of the Court allowed 
a state legislative initiative meant to undermine the state constitution, which 
provided that ex-felons would only be restored their voting rights upon 
payment of fees, fines, costs, and restitution. Id. at *4. Thereby, the legislature 
created a wealth requirement, analogous to poll taxes, which the majority 
allowed to stand. 
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A.  Congressional Discretion & Judicial Deference 
After the Civil War, the Constitution expanded 
congressional enforcement. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments bolstered the national legislature’s 
authority to rebuild the country according to first principles, 
while radically expanding the powers of the federal government 
from those granted at the founding.316 National government 
remained limited, however; contracts, torts, family, criminal, 
and testamentary law remained under the auspices of the 
states. 
The change in government powers was, nevertheless, 
dramatic. From the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
Congress was granted authority to pass laws rationally related 
to core values necessary for dismantling remaining badges and 
incidents of slavery, thereby establishing national norms for the 
enjoyment of liberty. Early laws, passed shortly after the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification, restructured the 
government by prohibiting racial discriminations in contracting 
and purchasing.317 Federal laws securing these freedoms, 
irrespective of race, demonstrated the breadth of implied 
authority.318 It has been understood since McCulloch v. 
Maryland that Congress enjoys power implicitly arising from 
enumerated constitutional provisions to pass “appropriate 
 
 316. Republican supporters of ratification sought “a practical application 
of that self-evident truth that [all men] are endowed by their creator with 
certain unalienable rights.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865). 
 317. Four statutes initially emerged to enforce the Amendment: The Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, the Slave Kidnapping Act of 1866, the Peonage Act of 1867, 
and the 1867 amendment to the Judiciary Act. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (1994)) 
(requiring all people born in U.S. to have some rights in property, contracts 
and personal security); Slave Kidnapping Act of 1866, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 
(holding as criminal anyone who kidnaps or induces any person to board a 
vessel or go any place for purpose of making him or her a slave); Peonage Act 
of 1867, Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (expanding scope of 
habeas corpus statutes). 
 318. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438–44 (1968). The 
concept of freedom for those who ratified the Constitution was not solely 
abstract but tied to the institution of slavery and its opposite. See Michael 
Vorenberg, Citizenship and the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF 
LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE THIRTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 58, 64 (Alexander Tsesis ed. 2010). 
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legislation” for achieving legitimate ends.319 This applies not 
only to Article I, § 8 grants but also to those enforcement clauses 
ratified after the Civil War. Those three grant the same degree 
of discretionary powers for adopting the “appropriate 
legislation” for the advancement of civil rights and civil 
liberties.320 
The Reconstruction Amendments empowered Congress to 
confirm the republican ideal envisioned by the general welfare 
provisions of the Preamble to the Constitution.321 Opponents to 
those constitutional changes advocated states’ rights to support 
racism that had predominated since constitutional 
ratification.322 They understood the radical restructuring of 
government that constitutional amendments forebode and 
 
 319. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.”); see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650–51 (1966) 
(“Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment grants Congress a similar power to 
enforce by ‘appropriate legislation’ the provisions of that amendment.”). 
 320. See Balkin, supra note 236, at 1807 (“The framers of the 
Reconstruction Amendments sought to ensure that the test of McCulloch 
would apply to the new powers created by the Reconstruction Amendments; 
that is why they included the word ‘appropriate’ in the text of all three 
enforcement clauses.”); see Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 747, 822–27 (1999) (writing of Congress’s authority to pass appropriate 
legislation under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments); McConnell, 
supra note 237, at 178 n.153 (1997) (asserting that the framers of § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment expected them 
to be interpreted pursuant to the Necessary and Proper analysis of McCulloch 
v. Maryland). 
 321. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (1865) (stating that 
the Preamble is a repository of moral and political truths which should guide 
formulation to any amendments); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2955 
(1864) (asserting that constitutional Reconstruction were to achieve the “object 
of this Constitution . . . admirably expressed in its preamble”). 
 322. Several opponents to the Thirteenth Amendment adopted racist 
ideology. For example, Democratic Senator Lazarus Powell believed the U.S. 
government “was made by white men and for white men.” CONG. GLOBE, 38th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1484 (1864). Sometimes this racial prejudice would adopt 
religious overtone such as when Delaware Senator Willard Saulsbury 
pronounced that God’s “providence is inequality.” Id. at 1442. 
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sought to retain state control over slavery and its incidents of 
unfreedom.323 
Congress’s powers to pass laws, such as the Religious 
Freedom and Restoration Act324 or Voting Rights Act,325 arise 
from its power to secure the fundamental freedoms. In such 
matters, implicitly connected to enumerated powers of the First 
Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction 
Amendments require the Court to defer to Congress.326 Judicial 
finality in striking legislative civil rights and civil liberties 
policies undermines the text, structure, values, and history of 
§ 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Contrary to 
the Court’s recent interpretive exclusivity in cases like City of 
Boerne, Morrison, and Shelby County, Congress should enjoy the 
prerogatives of setting rational policies to enact laws for 
freedom, equal rights, and voting privileges. 
When Congress expands civil rights pursuant to 
appropriate legislation reasonably crafted to enforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments, principles of constitutional 
reconstruction and their text require the judiciary to defer. 
Those three additions to the Constitution critically diminished 
the Court’s ability to thwart civil rights legislation as it had 
prior to the Civil War, in Dred Scott. 
Judiciary power, as we saw in Part II, is critical to 
protecting discrete and insular minorities, fundamental rights, 
and democratic voting. On the other hand, as Part III 
demonstrated, the Supreme Court overstepped its review 
function by vetoing statutes that reasonably advanced the 
legitimate government ends of safeguarding the free exercise of 
religion, providing causes of action for disability discrimination, 
 
 323. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 (1864) (noting the 
statement of Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky, who argued that State 
legislatures had the power to define “joining the rebel arms . . . which produces 
the forfeiture of the right of suffrage” as a crime). 
 324. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
 325. 52 U.S.C. § 10101. 
 326. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 236, at 1822 (“The framers of the 
Thirteenth Amendment assumed that Congress would define the badges and 
incidents of slavery and decide what legislation was appropriate to eliminate 
them, and that the courts would defer to any reasonable construction.”). 
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protecting voting rights against racial redistriction, and 
preventing sex discrimination. The judiciary should be 
deferential in cases reviewing congressional expansion of civil 
and political rights. On the other hand, heightened scrutiny is 
appropriate where legislators strip a judicially created 
protection.327 That balance is lacking in Tushnet and Waldron; 
nor is proportional thinking of those coequal branches 
adequately accounted for in Strauss or Dworkin.328 
Both the judiciary and Congress make policy decisions that 
must be consistent with the post-Reconstruction structure of 
government, traditions and the people’s collective conscience 
about fundamental principles,329 and grants of authority. The 
Constitution, in the words of Justice Brennan, is a “living 
charter.”330 Both the legislature and judiciary are responsible for 
its evolution from a document that protected slavery to one that 
guarantees fundamental liberties, equal protection, and racially 
neutral voting. The Constitution did not grant to the Court a 
monopoly on the exercise of “reasoned judgment”331 on such 
matters. As a legal phenomenon, the Court’s encroachments are 
instances of judicial hubris that undermine explicit 
reconstruction powers to pass laws in matters arising from the 
principles of fairness, equality, and representative democracy. 
Congress is often better able to quickly address public 
matters because lawmakers are not constrained by judicial rules 
of standing, ripeness, mootness, evidence, and the like. In many 
contexts, this enables Congress to deliberate on information for 
formulating laws that would be unavailable to courts under 
rules of evidence, including a large variety of top secret 
intelligence reports, constituent letters and petitions, and 
empirical data. The added depth not only allows legislators to 
 
 327. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(discussing when heightened scrutiny applies). 
 328. See supra Part I. 
 329. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965) (Goldberg, 
J., concurring) (discussing the Court’s protection of fundamental rights). 
 330. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 331. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (discussing the judicial role in interpreting personal 
autonomy); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 663 (2015) (same). 
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amass more information than a judicial record reveals, but also 
to rely on theories of political science, education, financing, 
philosophy, literature, sociology, anthropology, economics, and 
so forth that are outside the purview of judicial competence. 
These conditions of governance enable Congress to rely on the 
enforcement powers of the Reconstruction Amendments without 
heightened scrutiny. 
Enforcement legislation should be judged by whether it is a 
reasonable interpretation of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments. None of these confine legislative 
enforcement to judicial definitions. To the contrary, they are 
broad grants for enacting legislation consistent with the 
aspiration ideal of constitutional reconstruction, which includes 
structural mechanism against the judicial overreach of Dred 
Scott. Congress does not have plenary power but is limited by 
the substantive provisions of those three amendments.332 This 
does not, however, justify the Court’s automatic rejection of 
legislative initiatives not grounded in existing jurisprudence. 
B. Proportionality of Review and Enforcement 
A method of interpretation is needed that falls neither into 
the populist indeterminacy offered by Tushnet and Waldron nor 
the judicial supremacy tendered by Strauss and Dworkin.333 
Both courts and legislatures should play a role in protecting 
fundamental rights. 
There are good reasons to distrust all three branches of 
government. Judicial finality is not immune from error. The 
Reconstruction Amendments were meant to cure the defect in 
the early Constitution by providing the people’s representatives 
with power to pass laws consistent with freedom and equality 
 
 332. The Reconstruction powers over civil rights are not all encompassing; 
there is much that remains to discuss in future work. Among the most pressing 
are true conflicts between separate state claims of rights, speech, and religion. 
This topic must be addressed not by looking, as does this article, to the 
Reconstruction Amendments, which give power to the United States Congress, 
but to state powers over civil rights laws of general applicability. No cases 
better exemplify this issue than Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) and State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 
389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018). 
 333. See supra Part I. 
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principles.334 As Part III of this Article highlighted, the Court 
has often relied on formalistic modes of interpretation to prevent 
the exercise of congressional civil rights authority. Although 
space constraints limit the ability to discuss with as great detail, 
suffice to say that it is self-evident that legislatures too can pass 
inimical legislation such as the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 
1850335 and to a different degree the Defense of Marriage Act. 
(DOMA)336 Without adequate judicial review, the Court upheld 
the former during antebellum times.337 But the Court 
demonstrated the importance of Carolene Products heightened 
review in United States v. Windsor,338 which found DOMA to be 
unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds.339 
The enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction 
Amendments empower Congress with enumerated and 
incidental authority to pass laws for advancing liberal equality 
for the common good, as mandated by the Declaration of 
Independence and Preamble to the Constitution.340 Congress 
and the Supreme Court are at their maximum authority when 
advancing civil rights and civil liberties.341 Thus, when the 
Court’s definition of rights is broader and more protective than 
the legislatures, judicial review should favor heightened 
standards of scrutiny. On the other hand, when Congress’s 
enactment protects equality, liberty and advances the general 
welfare, then courts must defer to the people’s legislative 
representatives. The Reconstruction Amendments granted 
Congress power to formulate and enact policies advancing the 
 
 334. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 335. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
 336. Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 
(1996). 
 337. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 625–26 (1842) (invalidating a 
Pennsylvania law and upholding the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1793); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 522–26 (1858) (upholding the 
constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850). 
 338. 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 339. Id. at 775. 
 340. Tsesis, supra note 255, at 1626–42. 
 341. See id. at 1678 (“It is . . . essential that neither the Court nor 
Congress hamstrings the other’s authority to safeguard essential rights for 
pursuing the common good.”). 
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equal enjoyment of fundamental rights and citizenship. Such a 
scheme retains the judicial function of protecting individual 
rights, while allowing Congress to act on initiatives crafted to 
advance policies for the people’s general welfare. 
To best secure constitutional rights, courts should apply 
heightened scrutiny to cases set out in footnote 4 of Carolene 
Products, which I elaborated upon in Part II. The strong form of 
judicial veto reviewed in Part III, however, undercuts the 
enforcement mandates of the Reconstruction Amendments; 
thereby, the judiciary regularly thwarts Congress’s civil rights 
initiatives. In City of Boerne, the majority diminished 
lawmakers’ ability to protect free exercise rights under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.342 Congress relied 
on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass the RFRA.343 The 
aim of the legislation was to protect the free exercise of religion 
under the First Amendment.344 Congress’s power to pass law to 
advance the people’s entitlements under the Bill of Rights was 
no match to judicial supremacy. Also in Shelby County, which 
struck Congress’s § 4(b) formula to enforce the Voting Rights 
Act, the Court shattered decades of political compromises made 
by coalitions of lawmakers.345 
As with Shelby and City of Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, the 
Court has overstepped its interpretive prerogative to halt 
congressional efforts that were structurally, textually, and 
normatively consistent with the principles of constitutional 
reconstruction. Congress has the enforcement authority to pass 
appropriate laws reasonably likely to protect the free exercise of 
religion, monetary damages for state discrimination, and 
preclearance review against anti-discrimination. 
 
 342. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (ruling that the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not grant Congress 
substantive but only remedial enforcement authority). 
 343. Id. at 516. 
 344. Id. at 515–16. 
 345. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (holding that 
the Voting Rights Act § 4(b) was unconstitutional, rendering § 5 only 
constitutional by private suits rather than by defined preclearance 
proceedings). 
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C. Historical Evidence 
The judicial supremacy of Cooper v. Aaron, ruled on for civil 
rights purposes, has morphed into a doctrine of exclusivity that 
includes Boerne, Kimel, Garrett, and Shelby County expanded. 
All four cases ignore the history of the Reconstruction 
Amendments by depriving Congress of its prerogative to pass 
rational legislation to enforce principles of fundamental rights, 
equality, and franchise. The shift to legislative power that the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments established 
is evident from the Reconstruction Congress’s monumental 
achievements, such as the Enforcement Acts of 1870;346 the 
Second Enforcement Act of 1871;347 and, the same year, the 
Third Enforcement Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan 
Act.348 These statutes were passed in the immediate aftermath 
of the Reconstruction Amendments’ ratification, before the 
holding in the Civil Rights Cases dismissed meaningful national 
civil rights reform. They point to the framers’ intent to 
meaningfully restructure federalism, where Congress is 
supreme in the enforcement of reasonable legislation for 
equality, due process, and general welfare. These aims are 
proportionate; the Court retains the jurisdiction to strike laws 
passed with animus or other irrelevant reasons tending to harm 
persons or groups.349 
The terms of these statutes demonstrate the expanded 
federal role in securing rights through the Reconstruction 
Amendments. Historical analysis is consistent with U.S. legal 
semantics.350 
While my account is not exclusively historical—the method 
of this article has also been structural, textual, and value 
 
 346. First Enforcement Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 241). 
 347. Second Enforcement Act, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871) (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 9; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1357, 1442, 1446–47, 1449–50). 
 348. Third Enforcement Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as 
amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 51–55). 
 349. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100 (1971) (stating that 
the Ku Klux Klan Act requires a finding of some racial or class-based animus). 
 350. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12 (1991) 
(describing “constitutional modalities—the ways in which legal propositions 
are characterized as true from a legal point of view”). 
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rich—the appeal to history is undeniable.351 The Supreme Court 
has often relied on narratives of how Congress acted during 
Reconstruction to identify the range of changes created by 
constitutional reconstruction.352 This Article follows this 
precedential methodology to understand the range of options 
available to elected officials guiding the course of civil rights 
reforms. But it also recognizes something more. Professors 
Michael McConnell and Bruce Ackerman have argued severally 
that Reconstruction was one of those precise constitutional 
moments of social change and upheaval.353 It is only logical to 
examine what powers Congress exercised in the immediate 
aftermath of the three amendments’ ratifications of 1865, 1868, 
and 1870. Study of those statutes provides historical evidence of 
what the Reconstruction Congress understood about its own 
 
 351. This is not the Article for any extensive discussion of originalism, 
which I have discussed in some detail in Alexander Tsesis, Footholds of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1593, 1597–98 (2013). For more 
thorough discussions of the issue, see Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the 
New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 716–36 (2011) (discussing the varying 
theoretical approaches that fall under the rubrics of Old and New 
Originalism); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 339 (2011) (arguing that 
living originalism “offer[s] us the means to prevent bad decisions from 
occurring in the first place”); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 225 (1980). 
 352. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 741 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (reviewing the history that led to the enactment of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 
423– 35 (1968) (discussing 1833 congressional debates about injustices against 
Black people). 
 353. Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 
CONST. COMMENT. 115, 122 (1994) (citing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS 83 (1991)). Congressional debates on the Reconstruction 
Amendments demonstrated national determination to enforce legislative 
initiatives in a new federalist structure with significantly increased national 
powers. Alexander Tsesis, Reconstructing the American Dream, in WE SHALL 
OVERCOME: A HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE LAW 83 (2008). The House and 
Senate debates on the three amendments never even mentioned the possibility 
of Supreme Court overrides staying legislative authority. Prior to 1866 the 
Justices had only twice found federal laws unconstitutional. See generally 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1856). The degree of judicial activism from the 
post-Reconstruction period to today would have been entirely foreign to 
Congressmen who debated the meaning of the three amendments. 
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powers before the Supreme Court began to bevel away at its 
authority. 
The 1870 Enforcement Act prohibited states from using 
race, color, or previous condition of involuntary servitude to 
interfere with the right to vote.354 Criminal penalties were 
provided against election officers who refused to receive a vote, 
obstructed, or intimidated citizens from voting.355 The first act 
further prohibited conspirators from using disguises to prevent 
others from exercising constitutional rights.356 A further sign of 
the shift to nationalism was the granting of subject matter 
jurisdiction to district courts of the United States, which they 
held concurrently with state courts.357 Another crucial provision 
reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, with its protections of 
access to courts, contracts, and ownership.358 
The Second Enforcement Act of 1871 regulated 
unencumbered voting.359 Here too Congress granted subject 
matter jurisdiction to federal district courts.360 The Act was 
directed “primarily at Democratic practices in the North, 
focused on combating irregularities in voting in large cities.”361 
Of the three enforcement acts, the last passed has had the 
most enduring impact on American civil rights law.362 The Ku 
Klux Klan Act of 1871 created private liability against “any 
 
 354. 16 Stat. 140, § 1. 
 355. Id. §§ 3–5. 
 356. Id. §§ 6–7. 
 357. Id. §§ 8, 23. The current jurisdiction aspect indicates the extent to 
which Congress was willing to retain previously overlapping jurisdiction over 
subject matter. 
 358. Id. § 18. 
 359. 16 Stat. 433 (1871) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 9; 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1357, 1442, 1446–47, 1449–50). 
 360. Id. § 3. 
 361. ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION REMADE THE CONSTITUTION 118 (1st ed. 2019). 
 362. Plaintiffs in Sines v. Kessler claimed Defendants had “formed a 
conspiracy to commit the racial violence that led to the Plaintiffs’ varied 
injuries” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 324 F. Supp. 3d 765, 773–74, 
780– 81 (W.D. Va. 2018). A district court found it a plausible allegation that 
defendants were motivated by specific invidious animus. Id. at 773, 780. In 
Sines, the court found that Plaintiffs had a plausible case to pursue under the 
Thirteenth Amendment to vindicate the right against racial violence under 
federal law. Id. at 782. 
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person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall . . . depriv[e] of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution . . . law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage.”363 The Third Enforcement Act also reiterated the 
prohibition against conspiring with others or putting on a 
disguise to perpetrate vigilante violence.364 And the statute also 
granted a wrongful death cause of action to surviving “legal 
representatives of . . . [a] deceased person.”365 Anyone 
interfering with another’s “equal privileges and immunities” or 
who conspires to intentionally impede hinder, obstruct, or defeat 
the equal protection of laws is subject to penalty.366 This is 
clearly a private action Congress regarded as necessary to parse 
federal action against racist conduct. So broad was the effect on 
changing federalism from exclusive state civil actions to a 
federal scheme that the Third Enforcement Act remains the 
source of § 1983 practice.367 
With the enforcement of those three laws, Congress 
expanded rights beyond any judicial mandate.368 Passage of 
these laws immediately after ratification of the Reconstruction 
Amendments demonstrates the increased empowerment 
granted to Congress before the Court began thwarting federal 
civil rights statutes in Cruikshank and Harris, both cases the 
Court relied on in Boerne.369 These three enforcement statutes 
from the Second Founding showed a marked increase in 
Congress’s authority to pass legislation of criminal law that had 
been reserved to the states under the original Constitution. 
They were each to allow for national efforts against state 
prejudices. The judiciary thwarted Reconstruction, striking a 
 
 363. 17 Stat. 13, § 1 (1871). 
 364. Id. § 2. 
 365. Id. § 6. 
 366. Id. § 2. On the relevance of the intent component of the statute see 
Balkin, supra note 236, at 1842. 
 367. City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 (1985). 
 368. See Eric Foner, The Supreme Court and the History of 
Reconstruction—and Vice-Versa, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1597 (2012) 
(criticizing the Court’s state action doctrine). 
 369. 521 U.S. 507, 525 (1997). 
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law of national desegregation, the Civil Rights Act of 1875.370 
The same veto was used to strike the critically important 
preclearance provision out of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.371 
D.  Correcting Judicial Overreach 
The Court’s assertion of supremacy over congressional 
enforcement intrudes into legislators’ constitutionally granted 
prerogatives.372 The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have 
tightened the reins of power to steer constitutional 
interpretation in a direction contrary to the explicit language of 
the enforcement clauses. Under current doctrine,373 the Court 
deploys its power of review to restrict Congress from defining its 
own powers under the Reconstruction Amendments. This 
undermines legislators’ ability to enact policies consistent with 
the ethics behind their ratifications. The structure of 
government changed to expand national authority to pass 
legislation conducive to the equal dignity of persons in a 
representative and constitutional democracy. The judicial and 
legislative branches are jointly and severally responsible to 
protect fundamental liberties, equal protections, and 
non-discriminatory voting rights.374 These three can be further 
boiled down to equal liberty and associational rights, or liberal 
equality for the common good. However, as things stand, 
consistent with the holdings in Boerne and Shelby County, the 
Court can veto any prophylactic law regardless of congressional 
reasoning. 
The current doctrine does not square with the text of the 
enforcement clauses. The enforcement clauses of the 
Reconstruction Amendments granted Congress powers as broad 
as the Necessary and Proper Clause.375 The first of the ratified 
 
 370. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
 371. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). 
 372. See supra notes 50–53, 218–227 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra Part III. 
 374. I have argued elsewhere that all three branches of government should 
be governed by the principle of liberal equality for the common good 
established by the Preamble to the Constitution and the Declaration of 
Independence. See Tsesis, supra note 255, at 1626–42. 
 375. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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Amendments, in 1865, the § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment 
provided that, “Congress shall have power to enforce this article 
by appropriate legislation.”376 The Fourteenth Amendment’s 
fifth section authorizes similarly that, “Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article.”377 And § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides, in 
the same spirit and letter, “[t]he Congress shall have power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”378 All this sounds 
like the Necessary and Proper Clause with its well known 
deferential test. They closely resemble the Necessary and 
Proper Clause’s grant of “the foregoing powers [in Article I, § 8 
and] all other powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof.”379 The enforcement clauses of the 
Reconstruction Amendments were modeled from the same 
deferential norm to Congress in matters of civil rights. They 
grant Congress pro-active authority, not merely the power to 
respond to judicially defined harms. Hence, in cases involving 
statutes passed pursuant to congressional enforcement 
authority only rational basis scrutiny is appropriate. This 
conclusion is based on the norms, history, structure, and text of 
the Reconstruction Amendments, but it calls for a reworking of 
doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
The Reconstruction Amendments altered the structure of 
U.S. government in the realms of judicial review and legislative 
enforcement. They augmented the federal government’s power 
to guarantee individual liberties, civil rights, and racially 
nondiscriminatory voting. Their provisions provide legislative 
powers for achieving the national creed of liberal equality for the 
common good first articulated in the Declaration of 
Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution. The Second 
Founding envisioned a federal judiciary and legislature 
 
 376. Id. amend. XII, § 2. 
 377. Id. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 378. Id. amend. XV, § 2. 
 379. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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committed to fundamental rights; equal justice; and 
representative governance, untainted by America’s history with 
inequality. But by the late-nineteenth century the Supreme 
Court had weakened the mandates of legislative reconstruction. 
More recently, the Rehnquist and Roberts Court have further 
hobbled congressional enforcement powers while bolstering 
judicial veto powers.380 
This Article seeks a way forward to make strides in civil 
rights and civil liberties laws. A progressive balance between 
adjudication and legislation is essential to maintain appropriate 
checks and balances. Judicial review supplies levels of scrutiny 
for identifying rights, competing interests, and proportionate 
scrutiny. Heightened judicial scrutiny relies on the analytical 
abilities of judges to synthesize precedents, principles, and 
pragmatic judgments.381 Yet judges are not alone. Congress, like 
the judiciary, is obligated to carry out constitutional mandates, 
such as those found in the Reconstruction Amendments. 
Relying on judicial finality to override Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment legislation began during 
the post-Reconstruction period, when the Court struck laws 
such as the national desegregation provisions in the Civil Rights 
Cases. Even today, the Court’s veto over rights, equality, and 
voting—in cases such as City of Boerne and Shelby County—
undercuts meaningful efforts to enforce the principles of 
America’s constitutional reconstruction. 
 
 
 380. See supra Part III. 
 381. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(discussing heightened judicial review). 
